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discussed.

THE THEORY OF FINITE GOD IN PHILOSOPHY
FROM HUME TO THE PRESENT
SKETCH OF THE HISTORY OF THE EARLIER BELIEF IN
A FINITE GOD AS SEEN IN FOUR REPRESENTATIVE VIEWS
A. The beginnings of religious thought.
1. Genesis of all monotheistic beliefs in
polytheism. Cao
2. Each god of polytheism only a primus
inter pares ; therefore finite.^)
B. With the gradual evolution of thought a more
clearly defined conception of Deity
1. Growing emphasis on problem of theodicy
in religious thinking, leading to(a)
2. Epicurus 's (ca. 342 - 270 B.C.) classic
resolution of the difficulty : "Is God
willing to prevent evil but not able?
then is he impotent. Is he able but
not willing? then is he malevolent. Is
he both able and willing? V.hence then
is evil? " (jl- 3)
a. In reply to which he arrives, in
his thinking, at a finite God. (3)
G . Appears in the province of early Christian
history, in the rejection by Iiarcion of the
idea of the Creator-God. ^)

(2)
D. The re-appearance of the idea some five cen-
turies after Epicurus in the dualism of
Manichaeus, a Persian of the third century A.D.
(
4)
II. IT IS ONLY IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY HOWEVER,
THAT WE FIND THE IDEA GAINING REAL PROMINENCE
IN THOUGHT.
A. Voltaire (1694 - 1773) - hardly more than a
statement of his own "belief. C*"-
O
1 Some contradictory elements in Voltaire's
view of matter; out, accepting either of
the alternatives which he offers
, we
come to a finite God.. (fN>
2. God's "benevolence saved at the expense
of His omnipotence.
B. Rousseau (1712 - 1773) - here also hardly
more than a statement of his own belief. 0»- 1)
1. His doctrine of two substances, matter
and mind. CD
2. God "benevolent but not omnipotent, (t)
C. Hume (1711 - 1776) - The first clear and
definite discussion of the problem. (1-/0.^
1. Spirit of the times conducive to this
type of thinking. <i- 9)
2. The theory a3 viewed negatively and af-
firmatively in Hume's writings through
the discussion of Cleanthc3 and Phil0.f?-f/J

(3)
3. However, the question of whether Hume
himself really held to this view, as
expounded in his Dialogues Concerning
Natural Religion , is dependent on our
solution of the identity of the charac-
ters in that work* (?)
a. I here defend the Gleanthes-
Hume hypothesis, v/ith the con-
sequent suggestion that Hume's
own belief is in a finite God.
D. James Mill - the transition from the eigh-
teenth to the nineteenth centuries. d a )
III. BUT IT IS HOT FURTHER DEVELOPED UNTIL THE EARLIER
PART OP THE NINETEENTH CENTURY . THE TRACING OF
THE IDEA DURING TEE CENTURY AND A QUARTER SINCE
THEN, WITH CRITICISMS BRIEF OR DETAILED, OF ITS
EXPRESSION IN EACH OF ITS EXPONENTS.
A. John Stuart Mill - in whom we find the first
detailed defence of the theory. 0*>-
1. Causal connection from Hume through
James Mill to J. S. Mill. 0*0
2. "ill's philosophy end the prevailing
philosophy of the times
.
a. His hedonism, and that of Hume, as
bearing on hi3 thinking here.

(4)
3. Detailed exposition of Mill's defence.
4. Criticism.
a. Based, as also was Hume's
(1) on purely hedonistic ideal. (i*-**^
(2) on a false view of omnipotence . ^
b. Their conclusion is a "vacating" of,
the problems i io ~ l[ )
(1) and leaves no T.7e11anschauung
possible for them, cn-aO
B. William James. c>4-
1. Directly influenced by J. S. Mill. i 5t
2. His theory of a finite God results from
his "radical empiricism"; as he chooses
to designate it. tiMX>
3. Less concerned with proving finite God
in his thinking, than he is with develop-
ing the relation of that God to the world, car- 2.0
a. Such an approach naturally appeals
to our thought, BUT i*-0
b. Is it true? C*c- >**>.
4. Criticism of some of the specific and
novel details of James's view.
C. F. C. S. Schiller - from the standpoint of
1. ft clearer expression than in James, and
more consistently and logically developed.

(5)
2. Based on a pluralism and meliorism
similar to that of James's. ( *> ^
3. Criticisms.
a. From standpoint of power and of
evil open to much the same criti-
cism as Mill's vie?/.
d. Further criticism of Schiller's
view of personality, tea
R. B. Perry - from the standpoint of Ameri-
can neo-realism. C^-^O
1. Were there no other arguments, that from
the problem of evil alone would lead
Perry to a finite God.
2. The relation of such a view to individ-
ualism, c
3. The practical implications of his view./ 4
W
4. Criticism - on essentially the same
ground as of the preceding views, is V- art
G H. Howison - from the standpoint of
spiritual or personalis tic atomism. Or- -s?)
1. A unique setting for God finite.
a. All spirits in a true sense infin-
ite - "alike eternal, ultimate
irreducible realities", I**?*)
(1) God the ideal standard by
which they measure themselves,
and not the creator. OlO

(6)
2. Belief in an ultimate world-order - and
its relation to freedom. 3n >
a. God as Creator would eliminate
freedom. (^
3. Criticism of the details of Howison's
argument . ( « fc- *> *">
P. J. MoT. E. McTaggart - also from standpoint
of personalistic atomism. (38- 3i)
1. Has certain points in common with Howison,
hut oe)
2. Places God on a much lower scale in the
universe of selves; indeed, ultimately
seems to do away with him altogether. (**- 3ei
G. L. T. Hobhouse. (M- «H)
1. While his philosophical system very
different from that of James, ( 3<
2. His theory of God is quite similar. C^9- <+))
a. God as no more than a factor in
the whole of things. (Vo^
H. Hastings Rashdall. til- Hi)
1. His theory of a finite God in outstand-
ing contrast to those hitherto advanced,
and is by far the mo3t tenable, having
many points in common with the view of
Bishop McConnell. (Hi-

(7)
2. God's ethical perfection cannot be
questioned; his limitation is only from
the standpoint of power, and yet "we
can still call him omnipotent in the
sense that He possesses all the power
there is'1 ' , (tHi-H^)
I. H. G. ".Veils, who has given the theory its
status in the popular thought of the day. i^^- s
1. Two lines of descent "back to Hume. OH)
a. Through Wm. James, J. S. Mill and
James Mill,
b. Through Samuel Butler.
2. Mr, Wells's whole discussion more of a
polemic against any and all existing
forms of religion. c^-Ht)
a. Much of this can be explained
psychologically in the light of
his own earlier experience.
3. Brief outline of his theory. (vc-vs)
a. Distinguishes between God the
Creator and God the Redeemer. (44)
(1) His position toward the
former as one of "complete
agnosticism"; toward the
latter, one of "entire faith".

(3)
b. God growing and struggling "even
as you and I 1 ' .
4. Practical implications of his theory-
<
v? ' ^
5. Further criticisms. f^-^6 )-
The view is it is found in periodical liter-
ature of England and America, (s-o-s^)
1. Sir Oliver Lodge in the Hibbert Journal
(1911) Cro-r*),
a. Based on the reality of evolution'
and progress in the universe; and
on the creation of free creatures.
2. H. A. Overstreet in the Hibbert Journal
(1913). f«-^
a. Grows out of the new conception of
society (democracy), and changes
in "biological thought. Only this
new conception of God will be "con-
sistent with the spirit of evolu-
tional democracy."
3. H. W. Wright in the American Journal of
Theology (1907) (f»-rfl
a. Must have a limited God if we are
to retain the meaning of "that
moral struggle which from the point
of view of ethics constitutes the
heart and core of human life."

(9)
4. Kawaguchi Ukiclii in the American Journal
of Theology
.
(1915). c^-*^
a. Religion and ethics demand a concep-
tion of God in terms of evolutionary
experience. God, on the basis of an
evolutionary reality, must be con-
ceived of in terms of change and
growth
.
5. F. H. Poster in the American Journal of
Theology, frt- ,
a. A View growing out of a considera-
tion of Bergson's philosophy of
change. God, therefore, by his
very nature "not a static but a
progressing Being".
E. H. Reeman. A popular expression of the
idea of a finite God from the clergymans.
point of view, (n- 6 n)
1. A plea for the restatement of religion
in terms of "democratic outreach". Democ-
racy/ the negation of monarchy in religion
as well as in politics . U» -<»0
2. The problem of human suffering as it
leads to a limited God.O i- t> - '
V
3. The practical implications of this belief.

(10)
4. Criticism of this form of development of
the idea; over against which we place
our idea of a self-limited God.( fe4" fa*;
IV. CONCLUSION. THE MOST SIGNIFICANT EXPOSITION OP
THE BELIEF IN A LIMITED GOD, - THAT OF BISHOP
F. J. MCCONNELL; WITH WHICH ARE INCLUDED SOKE
CRITICISMS AND OUR OWN CONCLUSION CONCERNING
THAT BELIEF. (<»9- ion).
A« Factors, historical and contemporary, which
lead us to face our problem. C6<? ~ 7| )
B. Those limitations of God which seem really
to limit him, but are not, however, due to
external pov/ers or forces, but are an out-
growth of his own nature
.
C3§~ ?^
1. Those growing out of the relation of
God to the Creation of an external
material universe. These are "such
and such only as wisdom calls f or" , *')
a. God and space . Of- f{S' j
b. God and time . (ir-n)
c. God and physical evil, leading tociq-?<?)
d. The requirements of system as system.fn-fo)
e. The best as always binding the free
chooser.

(11)
Those growing out of God's relation to
the world of men, and the problem of
human freedom, fn-f?
a. The problem of omnipotence. Human
choices as conditioning divine ac-
tivity.
b. The problem of omniscience, (fi-tf,
(1) The most tenable solution
here lies in a view like
James ' s "Divine Chess-player".
c. "The bonds of creatorship" . Limita-
tions of membership in moral society,
and those of a holiness of his own
nature which is worthy of a responsi-
ble God. ($5--% r
(1) God's relation to prayer.
In the answered prayer God
must be true to: (ST-es)
(a) The petitioner.
(b) All others who compose
the family of God.
(c) Himself.
(2) Man cannot work alone, and
God's work is different when
the human mark is upon It.

(12)
3. Those inherent in the divine personality
itself. CO
a. God's "irresistible impulse to self-
expression 11 .
Those limitations of God which are customarily
considered as real limitations, hut which
prove themselves to be rather of a formal
character, (zq-qi)
1. The question of the absoluteness of God. (lo-n
2. The relation of the doer to the deed done.
3. The relation of God to a "course that
requires purposeful action according to
reason" . fti)
4. The universe as God's tool
.
5. The relation of God to law in the universe . C<» 2
6. God and the evolutionary process C 3^
7. God and the church. (<i 3- 14)
3. The relation of all personality to the
lav/ of development.
9. God and the question of that true per-
sonalit?/ which comes only as an out-
growth of moral struggle.
10. God and the divine and human methods
of knowing,

(13)
11. God and the 11 tightness" of personality
as we know it. C^t-IT).
D. The new vs. the old theology, as regards these
elements which would at one time have "been con-
sidered evidences of an unlimited God, but
which, if we were now to hold to them, would
limit God. (<tn- <oi}
1. The old idea of forgiveness and salvation ft i- 9 ^
2. An infallible revelation. C^S'^j
3. Exclusiveness of immortality. fot>^
4. The divine impassibility. lor)
E. In addition to Bishop McConnell's defence of
the finite God theory, there is but one more
approach which we must consider in order to
make our theory reasonably complete.
1. That of Professor E e S. Brightman. (»<>*.-
a. Growing out of a well-rounded
theory of moral obligation, and
b. Which is itself in accordance with
historical Christianity.
P. Conclusion, (.ion- tot)
1. Therefore, of the existent God views,
the finite God best answers the intel-
lectual and ethical demands of our na-
tures, and is most in accordance with
the facts of reality as we know them.

THE THEORY OF A F INITE GOD IN PHILOSOPHY
FROM HUME TO THE PRESENT
Epictetus, the old Roman Stoic, was a rather
keen analyst of human nature. Speaking at one point
in his Discourses of a tendency common to mankind, he
says most aptly, "As for us, we behave like a herd of
deer; when they flee from the huntsman's feathers in
affright, which way do they turn? What haven of safety
do they make for? Why, they rush upon the nets, and
thus they perish by confounding what they should fear
with that wherein no danger lies."^ 1 ) If the analogy
be permitted, may not even philosophers ofttimes be-
come so entangled as to be compelled to tarry there,
held captive within the bounds of a theory from whose
narrow confines freedom becomes singularly difficult,
if not actually impossible. It is toward such meshes,
such nets in the theistic forests that so many of the
advocates of the now fashionable theory of a finite
God must need3 find themselves heading.
This doctrine of a finite God is itself far
from a new one. If we are to affirm as Hume affirmed
( 1 ) Selections from the scouruna _oll ffipl r.tetws
(Geo. Long tr.), p. 70.

(2)
in his Natural History of Religion , and as subsequent
writers have agreed, that all monotheistic beliefs had
their genesis in polytheism, we shall have a finite
God implicit in the very origin of religious thinking.
Each god of polytheism was only a primus inter pares
in the midst of all the shapers of the great world's
fate; his power was necessarily limited by his fellow-g
or by the world about him. Even with one god singled
out and placed on an almost imcomparably higher plane,
there still remained the community of gods, and the
tangible world.
With the gradual evolution of thought,
there came more enlightened, more rationally builded
conceptions of Deity. The gods who had been every-
where in the world of man, struggling with man, with
companion-gods, and even with the great universe-
force itself, were given a different place in the
cosmical scale. Difficulties loomed before the minds
of the ancient thinkers, and the power of the gods
came to be conceived in quite a new fashion. Even
in that age we find the leaders of thought confronted
with the problem of theodicy.
It was by Epicurus, the philosopher of
Gargettos, (ca 432-270 B.C.) that the problem was given
its classic expression: "Is God willing to prevent
-1
.
_
i
(3)
evil, "but not able? then is he impotent. Is he able
but not willing? then is he malevolent. Is he both
able and willing? ?/hence then is evil?"^ 1 ^ This
riddle he solved for himself by his postulate that
Deity had no hand in the governance of things, else
why should we have a world, full of evils - "barren
deserts, arid mountains, deadly marshes, uninhabit-
able zones briars and thorns, tempests, hail-
storms and hurricanes, ferocious beasts, diseases
and premature deaths ,u '? Deity, enjoying a state
of absolute repose in a far-off home, "is unmoved
( 3)by the miseries of humanity"
?
v ; nor can there be
"magic divination, miracles, or any kind of inter-
course"^ between it and us. So we find that even
among the ancients a finite God, growing out of
the contemplation of the evils - in this instance
physical - existing in the world, was not unknown.
Limitation of time and space do not per-
mit us here to enter upon too detailed discussion
of the early evolution of the theory; we shall be
able only to touch upon several of the divergent
interpretations of it. In the province of Christian
(1) '.;.uoted by D. Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural
Rellgloil^ i-art X, P . 26Z
'.Veber, History of Philosophy, P, 137.
(3) op. cit., p. 137
(4) ibid, T. 137

(4)
history, we find such, a thinker as Marcion'^ rejecting
the idea of God as Creator. The Christian God for him
became a moral power, working and struggling in a
world for which he was not responsible. The implica-
tions of this view we shall discuss in connection with
its more detailed development in contemporary thought.
A signal development from a different aspect is the
dualistic one of Manicheism, through I.'anichaeus, a
(2)Persian of the third century A.D., who advocated
dual kingdoms, one of Light (or Good) and one of
Darkness (or evil), with the ruler of each necessar-
ily limited by that of the other. This view, in
which we find an emphasis on moral evil as well as
physical, today holds interest for us only because of
its historical significance; although in J. S. Mill's
Autobiography it is interesting to note that he makes
the statement that had his father, also a believer in
a finite God, known of this solution, it is the one
towards which his thinking would have most inclined.
We must content ourselves with this brief
survey of these more salient forms which the doctrine
assumed in earlier times, and now make a chronolorical
(1) Arrived in Home ca. 140 A..D. Definite date of hisbirth and death not known.
(2) Born 216 A.D. Put to death between 274-277 A D

(5)
leap over into the period of the earlier modern philos-
ophy, where we again find the theory gaining currency.
In the study of the eighteenth century philos
ophers several interesting expressions of the "belief
in a finite God come to light. First, perhaps, comes
that of Voltaire, whose much earlier predecessor,
Epicurus, we find so eminent an historian of philosophy
as Professor Weber characterizing as "this Socrate
double d'un Voltaire" ^ Voltaire's doctrine of God
and matter was no doubt occasioned by his contempla-
tion of the evil to individuals involved by an order
of nature according to law. His primary belief lies
in a God who is benevolent, who is good. However, as
he views the suffering about him, he becomes convinced
that this God is not, can not be omnipotent. God
must overcome a sort of unceasing opposition, which
opposition he ascribes to eternally existing matter.
But, in another connection Voltaire ascribes the cre-
ation of matter to God. which, of course, is in con-
tradiction with the theory of eternally existing matter
upon which his conception of a finite God rests. Even
on thi3 latter theory, however, he might retain his
belief in a finite God, by holding that God's wisdom
was necessaril:/ limited when he set about hi3 task of
(1) 7,'eber, op. cit., p. 135.
r-
-
(6)
creation; he did the best he could; and now like the
"boy who becomes a man and ungratefully enters into
battle against his father, matter, the created of God,
attains such power as to stand in fundamental oppoi-
tion to its maker. Voltaire did not, in any real sense,
develop his theory beyond its mere suggestion; therefore
we shall pass over further discussion of it, and view
the theory as it existed in a contemporary fellow-
countryman of Voltaire's, Jean Jaques Rousseau
(1712-1733)
.
Rousseau derived his religion not from the
contemplation of the purposive in nature nor from the
harmony of nature; rather it came to him as an immedi-
ate necessity of feeling. In view of the very divergent
methods of Voltaire and Rousseau, it is almost surpris-
ing to us to find the two men arriving at identical
conclusions concerning the finiteness of God. But,
like Voltaire, Rousseau hardly more than formulated
hi3 theory. His clearest expression of it is, I
believe, in the reply which he made on Nov. 13, 1762
to the "charge to the clergy" of M. Beaumont, the
archbishop of Paris. (1) Here he tells of his attempt
to think his way through the different systems which
presented themselves to his mind, and to make hi3
(1) "J. J. Rousseau a Chriatophe de Beaumont"Ouvr^i, Tone X, pp. 3-135, also in a letter Written
to M
, Jan. 15, 1769.
:-
(V)
owl the one involving the fewest difficulties, In
formulating his system as a whole, he finds that his
concept of God as good is to him a greater concept
than that of God as omnipotent;. Therefore, he does
not permit his experience of the suffering in the
world to destroy his "belief in a good God. This he
accomplishes through the doctrine of the two sub-
stances, matter and mind. His assumption is that
matter imposes limits to the carrying out of divine
ends; this matter, not created, but already existing
and perhaps eternal, is ordered according to certain
laws. It is God who thus orders and guides towards
the best; but this God is not and can not be omnipo-
tent. As with Voltaire, so with Rousseau, this theor
occupied only a minor place in the whole of his philo
ophy.
The real recognition of the idea of Cod as
finite first comes to us in the thought of the
Scottish philosopher, David Eume (1711-1766) who en-
joyed intimate friendship with Rqsseau for many years
until Rousseau's fiery disposition made that friend-
ship no longer possible. In the half century just
ending we see a general progress of causes leading
up to the clear and definite statement of the problem
which comes in Hume. Bacon and Locke had made their
-
(3)
great contributions to philosophy; the empirical
spirit, which later attained the height of its
eighteenth century prominence in Hume, was arising.
Progress there was and had "been, though slow, in
science. The world of thought had been for a brief
time almost deluged with Spinozistic pantheism and
a reaction was inevitable. So it was that the time
was most auspicious for the rekindling of the tiny
flame which has since grown to bonfire proportions
- the idea..of a finite God.
In Hume again we have a philosopher in
whose philosophy the theory of a finite God is not
generally treated. He has, however, devoted several
of his works notably the Natural History of Religion^
(2)
and the .Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion ' to
a discussion of the problems of religious belief.
It is with the latter of these works that we are at
present primarily concerned. There are in the
Dialogues three characters - Philo, with his ''care-
less scepticism"; Cleanthes, with his "accurate
philosophical turn"; and Demea, with his "rigid
(1) London, 1757.
(2) Probably written around 1749. Hume, in a letter
to Gilbert e^Minto (Mar. 10, 1751) speaks of his
criticism of the first draft of the Dialogues ; and in
another connection tells us he "kept the manuscript
by him for twenty-seven years". They were not pub-
lished, however, until 1779 - three years after
their author's death.

(9)
inflexible orthodocy" . Concerning the question as to
whether Cleanthes or Philo represents the real opinion
of the philosopher Hume himself, there is great differ-
ence of opinion. The Dialogues were published posthumous-
ly, so the only means we have of solving the identity of
the characters, is through a study and comparison of
Plume's works in their relations to the content of the
Dialogues . Such a study of those works, of his letters
which have been preserved for us, and of the biographies
of that philosopher has led me to the opinion - many of
the honorabls divines of his centur?/ as well as the
critics of later centuries "to the contrary notwithstand-
ing" J^"^ - that it is in the person of Cleanthes that we
find Hume's ovm. final beliefs. If that conclusion be
not erroneous, we may assuredly credit Hume with being
the first real advocate of the finite-God hypothesis
,
though he never really developed in its full detail
the theory which he adumbrated.
The question is resolved in Part X of the
Dialogues by Philo who says to Cleanthes, "Epicurus'
old questions are yet unanswered"^ - a subject for
discussion of which Cleanthes speaks as "worthy of a
(1) Huxley in hi3 Hume (p. 143), Hoffding in his History
of Modern rhllo 3opKy~Tp . 433 ) , and Prin^le-Pat bi3on"~in his
idea or"7To"d (pp. 20-21) maintain the Philo-llume hypothesis
vs. the Cleanthes-Ilume hypothesis which I defend.
(2) pp. 263-268.
(3) op. cit., pp. 260, 267.
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noble spirit of opposition and controversy .
"
v ; After
some preliminary statements by both disputants, the
(2)
argument begins in earnest in ^art XI. Cleanthes
scruples not to allow that he has "been apt to suspect
the frequent repetition of the word 'infinite' to
savor more of panegyric than of philosophy"; and
that any purposes of reasoning, and even of religion
would be better served were we to rest contented with
more accurate and more moderate expressions. A criti-
cism of Demea, who would abandon all human analogy
and thus ''abandon all religion and retain no concep-
tion of the great object of our adoration" follows;
after which Cleanthes boldly grasps the other horn of
the dilemma. "If we preserve human analogy", says
he, "we must forever find it impossible to reconcile
an-/ mixture of evil in the universe with infinite
attributes: much less can we ever prove the latter
from the former. But supposing the author of nature
to be finitely perfect, though far exceeding man-
kind; a satisfactory account may then be given of
natural and moral evil, and every untoward phenom-
enon be explained and adjusted A less evil may
(1) op. cit., pp. 226, 267.
(2) Hume, op. cit., pp. 268-274.
(3) ibid., 263.
(4) ibid., 269.

(11)
then be chosen in order to avoid a greater: inconven-
iences be submitted to, in order to reach a desirable
end: And, in a word, benevolence, regulated by wisdom
and limited by necessity, may produce just such a world
as the present" „ ^ Philo is asked for his opinion of
the theory just stated, whereupon Cleanthes finds him
in disagreement with it. Philo' s view is, as he ex-
presses it, this: "The true conclusion is, that the
original source of all things is entirely indifferent
to all these principles; and has no more regard to
good above ill, than to heat above cold, or to drought
above moisture, or to light above heavy. There may
four hypotheses be framed concerning the first causes
of the universe: that they are endowed with perfect
goodness; that they have perfect malice; that they are
opposite, and have both goodness and malice; that they
have neither goodness nor malice. Mixed phenomena can
never prove the two former unmixed principles, arid
the uniformity and steadiness of general laws seem
to oppose the third. The fourth, therefore, seems
(2)by far the most probable". So it is that
in the Dialogues we have both a splendid and con-
cise statement of the theory of a finite God and
an opponent view. Certain it i3 that Hume best
(1) ibid., 269.
(2) ibid., 273.
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expressed for his century the theory; and in the light
of the available data, I hold it as my opinion that
this is his own belief as well, withal frankly recog-
nizing that whether or not we may credit Hume himself
with the belief in a finite God depends wholly upon
our solution of the problem behind the Dialogues ,
is it to Gleanthes or to Philo that we may attribute
the real conclusions of Hume, the philosopher?^)
From Hume to the first nineteenth century
exponent of the theory is but a short step with only
one mediator. John Stuart Mill develops the idea of
a finite God throughout his series of essays on
(2)
religion, v ; likewise posthumously published. The
idea was one which the elder Mill, who had been
profoundly influenced by Hume, had inculcated in him
from his childhood. J. S. Mill tells us. speaking
of his father in the Autobiography
,
v
'
"He found it
impossible to believe that a world, so full of evil
was the work of an Author combining infinite power
with perfect goodness and righteousness". It is
hardly to be wondered at that a youth educated by
the elder Mill until his fourteenth year and throughly
schooled in agnosticism, should develop in his
maturer years this principle which in his earlier
years had become so organic to his thinking.
( 1 ) df . above
.
(2) J. 3. Mill, Three Essays on Religion
. ;
(13)
MiIlk philosophy, in which we find the first
detailed defence of a finite God, was partly an adapta-
tion of the empiricism and phenomenalism of Hume, and
in fundamental agreement with Comtian positivism in
denying all knowledge of an Absolute ; it was likewise
an attempt to combat the idealistic method of reaching
God which had been so prevalent in Hegel and in
Schelling. Mill looked about him and saw as he ex-
presses it, that "Nature impales men, breaks them as
if on the wheel, casts them to be devoured by wild
beasts, burns them to death, crushes them with stones
like the first Christian martyrs, starves them with
hunger, freezes them with cold, poisons them by the
quick or slow venom of her exhalations, and has hun-
dreds of other hideous deaths in reserve such as the
ingenious cruelty of a ITabi or a Domitian never sur-
passed. All this Nature does with the most super-
cilious disregard both of mercy and of justice".
^
But Nature is not 'wholly thus; although it has this
destructive aspect, "the destroying agencies are a
( 2
)
necessary part of the preserving agencies", ' and
there is evidence of design in the universe. "The
indication points to the creation, not indeed
(1) J.S. Mill, Three Essays on Religion, p. 29
(2) op. cit., pTT55
•>
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of the universe, but of the present order of it, by
an Intelligent Mind whose power over the materials
was not absolute, whose love for his creatures was
not his sole actuating inducement, but who neverthe-
less desired their good" .^ In fact, Mill has taken
this very argument from design in itself as opposing
a belief in an infinite Being. "It is not too much
to say that every indication of Design in the cosmos
is so much evidence against the omnipotence of the
(2.)Designer", * ' for design is equal to contrivance and
contrivance is equal to the adaptation of means to
an end. Thus the need of employing means "is a con-
sequence of the limitation of power". °' wisdom and
contrivance are shown in overcoming difficulties, and
there is no room for them in a Being for whom no dif-
ficulties exist. "The evidences distinctly imply
that the author of the cosmos worked under limitations
that he was obliged to adapt himself to conditions in-
dependent of his will, and to attain his ends by such
arrangements as those conditions admitted of
There is no reason in nature to suppose that this
Being made matter or force or any of their properties.
(1) ibid., p. 242
(2) ibid., p. 176
(3) ibid., p. 177
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Rather out of these materials he had to construct a
world". "The limitation of his (the Creator's)
power probably results either from the qualities of
the material - the substances and forces of which the
universe is composed not admitting of any arrangement
by Y/hich his purpose might have been more completely
fulfilled, or else, the purpose might have been more
fully attained, but the Creator did not know how to
do it; creative skill, wonderful as it is, was not
sufficiently perfect to accomplish his purposes more
thoroughly It needs no showing that the power, if
not the intelligence j must be so far superior to that
of man as to surpass all human estimate. But from
this to omnipotence and omniscience there is a wide
interval, the distinction being of great practical
importance" . "Omnipotence therefore cannot be
predicated of the Creator on the grounds of natural
theology. The fundamental principles of natural
religion as deducted from the facts of the universe
negative his omnipotence. They do not, in the same
manner exclude omniscience neither is there
( 3
)
anything to prove it". "While we confine our-
selves to natural religion we must rest content
with a creator le33 than the Almighty". In a con-
templation of the world about us, we see the
(1) ibid., 177
(2) op. cit., p. 176
(3) ibid., p. 134
II
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existence of evil and misery, which have to bear on
our idea of God. We now pass to the moral attributes
of the Diety - what indication Nature gives of the
purposes of its author, "The question bears a very
different aspect to us from what it bears to those
teachers of natural theology who are incumbered with
the necessity of admitting the omnipotence of the
Creator, We have not to attempt the impossible
problem of reconciling infinite benevolence and jus-
tice with infinite power^ in the creator of such a
world as this. The attempt to do so not only involves
absolute contradiction in an intellectual point of
view but exhibits to excess the revolting spectacle
(O)
of a Jesuitical defence of moral enormities' . '
"These, then, are the nst results of natural theology
on the question of divine attributes. A Being of
great but limited power, how or by what limited we
do not know nor can we even conjecture; of great and
perhaps unlimited intelligence, but perhaps also more
narrowly limited than his power; who desires and pays
some heed to the happiness of his creatures, but who
3eem3 to have other motives of action which he cares
more for, and who can hardly be supposed to have
(1) Note the similarity to Hume's phraseology.
(2) Mill, op. cit., o. 13G
. ;-v ... - -
•
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created the universe for that purpose alone. Such
is the Deity whom natural religion points to, and any
idea of God more captivating than this comes only
from human wishes or from the teaching of either real
or imaginary revelation 5 '
.
Now that Mill has rid himself of the !,mass
of moral contradictions which the deluded worshipper
was compelled to swallow", he goes on, quite in ac-
cordance with his utilitarianism, to express the im-
plications of such a view. "One elevated feeling
this form of religious idea admits of, which is not
open to those who believe in the omnipotence of the
good principle in the universe, i.e., the feeling of
helping God, of requiting the good he has given by a
voluntary co-operation which he, not being omnipotent,
really needs, and by which a somewhat nearer approach
may be made to his purposes To do something
during life, on even the humblest scale if nothing
more is within reach, towards bringing this consumma-
tion ever so little nearer, is the most animating and
invigorating thought which can inspire a human creature;
and that it is destined, with or without supernatural
sanctions to be the religion of the future, I cannot
1 2 )
entertain a doubt." v ' Such is Mill '3 development
(1) ibid., 194
(2) J.S. Kill, op. cit., p. 256. (Conclusion of Essay III)
He also states this view, in almost identical words, in a
letter to Robert Barclay Fox, written in 1841. cf. Caroline
Fox's Diaries
j
Vol. n, p. 206.
-
(18)
of this view, sketched in relative detail, for it is
here in Mill that it is really first given a position
of fundamental importance in the modern period. Since
in Voltaire, Rousseau and Hume it was hardly more
than a suggestion, it is with Mill that our real
criticism must "begin, not however neglecting his im-
mediate predecessor Hume.
In Mill, as in Hume, there was the basic
hedonistic assumption underlying all his thought.
The frequent mention of "happiness" throughout Hume's
works, and especially in connection with his discussion
of theological questions, and Hill's careful develop-
ment of his utilitarianistic doctrines, the principle
of pleasure as being the ruling motive of life, the
subordinating of the real values and ideals of life
to that principle,, are contributing factors in the
building of both Hume and Mill's belief in a finite
God. Of course, no one of us can look about him and
see a perfect universe, if perfection means for us
no more than undiluted enjoyment. As Professor
Pringle-Pattison once said, "We degrade it to a child's
paradise in so conceiving it. It is not perfect in
the sense that there is no evil in it; for it is
equally childish to imagine that Good can exist for
a finite creature except a3 the conquest of
--
. c
i
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-
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evil". ; If we are to think of happiness at all, it
is rather that kind of happiness of which we are told
in the closing paragraph of George Eliot's £tomolaj "We
can only have the highest happiness, such as goes along
with being a great man, by having wide thoughts and much
feeling for the rest of the world as well as for our-
selves] and this sort of happiness often brings so much
pain with it, that we can only tell it from pain by its
being what we should choose before enything else, because
our souls see it is good" . The pleasure idea, the
purely hedonistic ideal, then, in both Hume and Mill,
seems to me to lie at the root of their argument for
a finite God, and if they will have no reference to
the realm of something objectively higher and better,
to the realm of intrinsic worths, to the ideal values
in the universe, of course the existence of suffering
in that universe will ever make it impossible for
them to believe in the benevolence of an infinite. God.
They must retain the idea of divine benevolence in
order to have any foundation at all for their ethical
lives, so God becomes for them seriously limited in
power. The?/ have but thesis and antithesis; to their
restricted vision no synthesis is possible.
This view defended by both Hume and Mill
is likewise defective in its way of conceiving the
attribute of omnipotence in Deity. This idea of mere
(1) A. Geth Pringle-Pattison, The Idea of God. p. 407.
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power is the 'crudest and earliest predicate of the
divine. The concept of All-powerful is predicated
of God by men long before that of All-good, and this
power is thought of in terms of physical force. In-
deed, it means ofttimes no more than "able to do any-
thing". But as man himself rises in the moral scale,
ethical considerations begin to creep in; the ethical
attributes begin to take their place in our conception
of God, and difficult problems arise. A struggle en-
sues; then some philosophers, here Hume and Mill, step
in and settle the quarrel by eliminating one of the
contestants, power or omnipotence. They do not
realize that it is perhaps their view of omnipotence
which has been at fault. They end the conflict by
doing away with it entirely, and their solution be-
comes rather,- as Borden P. Bowne was so fond of
saying - a mere "vacating" of the problem. When -we
really come to study it how crude an idea it becomes I
God is given only limited power and foresight, say
the defenders of this theory. Let them only look
about their world then. How legion are the ills, the
faults of construction which even man, with his rela-
tively very limited intelligence might have avoided.
And if God be really responsible for these, his under-
standing surely cannot be as great as that of some of
-
(21)
his creatures, who, it seems, would have had greater
foresight. Thus man's Maker becomes quite inferior
to man; why, therefore, have him at all? Man has
gone so far in dispensing with God,* why cannot he go
the whole way? That God nay, because of the intrinsic
values of his own nature, limit himself, is not even
considered; they must have something else to limit
him - matter, force, or a baker's dozen of assorted
other things. Mill criticized those who sought for
the solution of the problem as tending towards the
older dogmatism; but was his assertion that the
problem never could be solved any less dogmatic?
This very evasion of the real problem by
Hume and Mill leaves us with what seems to me to be
a greater problem. By making God after their fashion
finite we reach no real YJe ltanschauung
, no satisfac-
tory world view. Has God undergone a process of
evolution until he reached his present high state;
has he come into it as he now is? We might think
of any number of questions concerning his origin
and existence. Such a finity implies something
wholly extraneous, something more ultimate, and we
wonder what this is. Perhaps we a3k the question of
our childhood, "who made God?"; certain it is our
minds mu3t enquire concerning the basic world-ground.
i-
(22)
We "become hopelessly lost in a fundamental dualism,
or pluralism which leads we know not where. God not
only is not ""finite, he is not ultimate. We find our-
selves - if I may be permitted the use of the expres-
sion - with a penultimate, or antepenultimate deity.
Such an expression of a finite God as we have here
fails to recognize the fact that if we are to think
rightly about our world, we must sometime in our
thinking come to a Grenzbegrif
f
- an ultimate prin-
ciple, (which, as theists, we call God) explained by
(2)
nothing but which explains 'all else about it.
That, I believe, is one of the defects of much of the
theorizing about a finite God both in the time of
Hume and Mill, and the earlier thinkers, and at the
present time as well. We are left, suspended, as it
were, in mid-air with only a fraction of a world view,
which is of course, a contradiction in terms, and
therefore no world view at all.
The argument from practical effect, to which
Mill gave such prominence, we shall discuss in a later
connection where it is even more evident.^ There
are other criticisms which might be offered of Mill's
view, a few of which we shall only touch upon here.
(1) of. that of Mr. II. G. Wells.
(2) i.e., within certain limits I
(3) cf . under Win. James and H. G. Well3.
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Mill lived at the height of the wave of naturalism
in theology, which as we now see was only a fragment
in the higher whole of an adequate world view. His
whole interpretation in the light of that naturalism
was therefore inadequate. There is "but one further
point which I should like to suggest in this connec-
tion - a point the justice of which may be questioned;
nevertheless, I put it forth here as a speculation
which is at least possible. Not infrequently it
seems to me that much of a man's philosophy may be
understood in the light of his whole life and think-
ing. Mill had been reared in an atmosphere where
naturalism and a limited God reigned supreme; might
not his later elaborate defence of the theory have
been almost what James Harvey Robinson has popularly
called the "rationalization"^ of that earlier be-
lief? While the genesis of the idea would not affect
its value in itself, nevertheless the process of trac-
ing the causal connection of ideas is interesting,
ajid I am inclined to wonder if Mill would have reach-
ed this conclusion independently.
(1) Gf. his The Mind in the Making Robinson deals, how
ever, primarily with the rationalization of our desires
Prof. E. 3. Brightman, in hi3 recently published Intro -
duction to Philosophy
, (p. 9), makes an even more fruit
ful suggestion - i.e., that concerning the equally or
more important rationalization of our antipathies.
... ' ' .
(24)
But hovrever he himself arrived at his re-
sults, certain it is that he tremendously influenced
other thinkers, the first of whom is William James.
Again it may he interesting to note the thought con-
nection. We see that in James's Pragmatism , in which
is his "best development of the finite God idea, the
author has acknowledged his great indebtedness to his
predecessor, Mill, by dedicating this volume - "To
the memory of John Stuart Mill, from whom I first
learned the pragmatic openness of mind, and whom my
fancy likes to picture as our leader were he alive
today." Jame's idea of God as finite results from
a general view of the universe which he chooses to
designate as radical empiricism, and from his plural-
ism which, as he says, "best agrees with the pragmatic
temper". His conception of the world is as "growing
not integrally but piecemeal by the contributions of
its various parts" "a strung along unfinished
world in time". His view is fundamentally a protest
against the old "block-universe" idea, and leads to
the assertion that evil is not just a mere appearance;
that the human will is creative, and that there is
reality to history. To reach an idea of God consonant
with this view, he falls back on the hypothesis of a
(1) James, Pragmatism* P- 290.
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)
finite God, whom we must clearly distinguish from the
Absolute. God cannot be the All; he is rather "one
of the eaches",^ 1 ) "finite either in power or in
(2)knowledge, or in both at once", 1 and "having an
environment, being in time, and working out a history,
just like ourselves" . James is less concerned
with proving a finite God - rather is it a necessity
in his thinking - than he is with developing the re-
lation of that God to the world. As a consequence,
he elaborates in far greater detail Hill's view of
the practical consequences of such a belief. Says
James, "take the hypothesis seriously, and as a live
one. Suppose the world's author put the case to you
before creation, saying, 'I am going to make a world
not certain to be saved, a world the perfection of
which shall be conditioned merely, the condition be-
ing that eac?i several agent does its own level best.
I offer you the chance of taking part in such a world.
Its safety, you see, is unwarranted. It is real
adventure with real danger, yet it may win through";^
thus it follows that "it is a social scheme of
(1) Jame3, A Pluralistic Universe, pp. 44, 123. Gf.
EEagffifijzlaa p., 264.
(2) op. cit., p. 311.
(3) ibid., p. 313.
(4) Pragmatism, p. 290.
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cooperative work genuinely to "be done". Furthermore,
"may not the notion of a world already saved in toto
anyhow "be too saccharine to stand? Is no price
to be paid in the work of salvation? Is all
'yes, yes' in the universe? Doesn't the fact of 'no'
(2)
stand at the very core of life? 11 So it is that we
have "before us a picture of an unfriendly universe,
but one with grovrth going on everywhere - a universe
which would most assuredly fit that "healthy-minded
"buoyancy" which exists in most of us. 'This is the
view to which James gives the name, "Llelioristic Theism'
a theism which he holds to he a mean ""between the two
extremes of crude naturalism on the one hand and
transcendental absolutism on the other", and on the
basis of which we find ourselves living in a "moralis-
tic and epic kind of a universe".
At first glance, James's view of such a
universe is very attractive; its appeal to our active
nature is tremendous. But mere appeal is not enough;
we must go further, must consider its relation to
truth. Of course, if we are to test it by James's
criterion of truth, "it works", and is, therefore,
true. But here the question arises, is not James's
criterion of truth inadequate? - must there not be
(1) (2) op. cit., p. 295.
(3) ibid., p. 296.
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some further reference to reality? Of course, we have
a God whom we believe to he on our side, who is ac-
cessible to us, and whom we can help in the making
of a better and finer world; but what is there to
assure us that this God will ever be so? What is the
source of his power? The Absolute whom James differen-
tiates is merely the "eternally perfect spectator of
the play u and so of little value either to God or to
us in the struggle of life. And the further question
arises - why should we struggle at all? There is not
overmuch inspiration to us in merely saying our little
lines, playing our little part in the spectacle of the
cosmic drama, and then leaving the stage forever. We
must have something more than we can find either in
this "spectator" Absolute or in this struggling God.
Thus we reach the same criticism of James's thinking
as we did of Mints - it gives us no adequate world
view. While the spirit of conquest may be with us
for the time being and v/e may feel rather important
in our self-appointed task of helping the less - than -
Almighty v/ho couldn't help himself - to make the world
really amount to something, the time is certain to
come when we are to ask concerning the future; v/e
crave the assurance that there i3 something more
permanent to our ideal world; a feeling comes to us,
-
(28)
as it did to Arthur Hugh Clough, and we want to be
able to srji
"It fortifies my soul to know
That, though I perish, Truth is so:
That, howsoe'er I stray and range,
Whate'er I do, Thou dost not change.
I steadier step when I recall
That, if I slip, Thou dost not fall'" 1 '
To give us the necessary confidence to travel well
along life's way, we must have a world of ideals which
is not just a "strung-along world"; a God who is more
than just another fact in the great collocation of inde-
pendent facts. As Professor Pringle-Pattison somewhere
30 aptly said, I too say, "I confess 1 find it impossi-
ble to reduce the universe to a mere 'and'; to conceive
a being of transcendent intelligence and goodness as
no more than one of the facts in the universe, seems to
make it harder than ever to think of other facts as just
happening to be there along with him - just happening
to exi3t also, and getting in his way actively or
passively. Admit intelligence or an ideal factor at
all, and it seems impossible to conceive it otherwise
than as central and all-explaining" 2 ) So it is that
(1) A. H. dough: "With /.horn Is No Variableness, Neither
"hadow of Turning"
.
(2) The Idea of Pod, p. 396. However, let us recognize
that this "all-expTaining" of Pringle-Pattison will stum-
ble o.gainst the problem of freedom; even taking that into
consideration, though, such a view is more consonant
with our universe idea.
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we find James's finite God quite scant ground for any
real world view. There is "but one further criticism
of that particular kind of a finite God which it may
be well to note in this connection, and that is the
one insisted upon "by Professor Wright in his recent-
ly published "Student's Philo sophy of Religion" . "A
more serious objection", says he, "would be that the
hypothesis of an external God^ 1 ^ has to be incorporat-
ed into the science of psychology and so to be made
operative upon a plane where it does not seem properly
to belong". (2)
Leaving, then, James's statement of the
theory, we pass to some of the other and more numer-
ous expressions of the belief in a finite God in the
few decades just passed, notably those of the prag-
matist, F. C. S Schiller; of the logical atomist or
neo-realist, R. B. Perry; of the spiritual or personal-
istic atomists, G. H. Howison and J. McT. E. McTaggart
;
of L. T. Hobhouse; of Hastings Rashdall, the personal
idealist; of I.'r. H. G. 'Veils, E. II . Reeman; and
lastly of Bishop P. J. McConnell, and E. S. Brightman -
theories which except in the instance of Bishop
McConnell, it will lie in the scope of this paper,
(1) as in James.
(2) Wright, op. cit., p. 379
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only to outline and to criticize briefly. '
We shall first consider the vidw of Mr.
F. C. S. Schiller, a contemporary of James, as it is
developed in his "Riddles of the Sphinx ". God is for
him the unbecome and non-phenomenal cause of the world
process - its Initiator. God is also the Sustainer of
this process, as being a factor in the interaction
of the Ego and the Deity. It is only by ascribing
personality to him that he can be regarded either as
the Cause or Perfector of the world-process, and this
personality must be conscious, not one of those
"gratuitous fictions like an impersonal intelligence
or unconscious purpose". But this God is^the in-
finite, "or rather to God infinite is an un-
meaning epithet" . "To infer the infinite from the
finite is a fallacy like inferring the unknowable
from the knowing and all arguments in favor of an
infinite God must commit it. We argue with finite
minds from finite data and our conclusions must be
(1) ",re shall also consider the expressions of the
idea a3 it is found in periodical literature, in articles
by Sir Oliver Lodge, K. A. Overs tree t, H. T,V. '.'/right,
Kawaguchi Ukichi, and P. H. Foster.
(2) Schiller. Riddles of the Sphinx, Chapter IX.
(3) op. cit., TTh. VII.
i
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of like nature" , God is a factor in all things "but
cannot "be all things; interaction implies a not-God to
act upon God. Here it seems to me Schiller is quite
in accord with our views, for must there not at least
he a pluralism of selves, of which God is the creator,
(9)
and yet which have their own unique individuality? v b '
We insist upon ascribing, indeed must ascribe some of
our human attributes to the divine, for those human
attributes are all we can know. But infinity is not
compatible with this . "And not only is the combina-
tion of human and infinite elements in the conception
of God an outrage upon the human reason, but it leads
to no less outrageous consequences from the point of
view of human feeling. For by ascribing unlimited
power to God, it makes God the author of all evil, and
imprisons us in Hell to escape from which would be
rebellion against omnipotence. To he brief, the at-
tribute of Infinity contradicts and neutralizes all the
other attributes of God, makes it impossible to ascribe
to the Deity either personality or consciousness, or
power, or intelligence, or wisdom, or goodness, or
purpose, or object in creating the world; and infinite
Deity does not effect a single one of the functions
(3)
which the religious consciousness demands of God"
.
(1) ibid., p. 304.
(2) Cf. our discussion of Bishop McConnell's view.
(3) "chiller, op. cit., p. 50.
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Of the considerations leading up to this view of
Schiller's there are several of which we must take
notice. While his objection to the older conception
of power is, I believe, quite correct, we find him
erring greatly in his conception of personality. He
cannot see how an infinite personality can allow for
a distinction of finite persons, and so it is that he
rejects the characteristic of infinity; nor can he
see how, with an infinitely good God, the distinction
between good and evil can have any meaning. But evil
is a reality, thus presenting a most difficult problem
to his mind, and one which leads to his statement,
"Hence it is not surprising that no attempt at recon-
ciling the divine goodness with divine power has ever
been successful" .^ Briefly, then, he concludes,
"Religion, philosophy, and science alike demand a
belief in a personal and limited God".^ 2 ) Schiller's
theory is open to much the same criticism as that of
Mill's from the standpoint of the relations of power
and evil. Like James's view it is based on a sort of
pluralism and meliorism, but unlike James's, it seems
to me, it is more logically and consistently developed.
It is Schiller's view of personality which is most in-
adequate, for it permits him to effect no real synthesi
(1) (2) ibid., p. 308.
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between the conflicting elements of life, and thus no
satisfactory world view.
Also in accord with James's fundamental po-
sition is that of R. B. Perry, the American neo-realis
or as W. R. Sorley would prefer, the "logical atomist 1 '
who so commends James's preference for - if we borrow
the poet's words - the "dome of many colored glass" to
"the white radiance of eternity". Indeed, Professor
perry's whole argument follows James very closely, and
his conclusion is the same. "Only by supposing that
things happen without or despite his (God's) will,
is it possible to exonerate God of responsibility for
evil". In fact, he considers this argument from
evil in itself adequate to lead us to a finite God,
were we to leave out of consideration all the others
which have been advanced in support of this view.
"It has often been objected with force that many per-
fections are incompatible; that it is impossible, for
example, that a being without limits, a being coincid-
ing with the totality of things, should possess mental
or moral perfections; since "these seem to imply a re-
lation of the subject to something beyond itself. But
the modern pluralist doe3 not argue from any such
dialectical consideration; he simply points to the
(1) Perry, The Present Conflict of Ideals, p. 326.
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facts of evil in the world, and sets this question -
would you rather have an infinite God who- designed
these evils, or a finite God who condemns them and
opposes them as you do?"^) The practical implica-
tions of this also appeal to Perry, for this is "not
a religion for the helpless who wish to recline upon
the bosom of an Almighty and leave it all to his
highest and inscrutable wisdom. It is a religion for
those in whom the fighting spirit is alive, and who
are stonehearted enough to respond to the challenge
of evil as to an enemy to be attacked and overcome"
The motive of individualism also finds expression in
the conception of God as finite, "Just as the human
individual must possess a unique inner life of his
own which must always be strange and new to everyone
but himself, so God also, if he is to be an individual,
must remain outside the circle of every other being"
Thus Professor Perry bases his argument on three under-
lying motives: (1) it relieves God of responsibility
for the evil in his universe; (2) it permits individ-
ualism, and (3) it is an appeal to manly courage. We
may criticize this view on essentially the same
grounds a3 those on which we have based our criticisms
(1) Perry, op. cit., p. 327
(2) ibid., p. 327
(3) ibid., p. 323.
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of Mill, James, and Schiller. v ; Since there is
nothing really unique or original in perry's statement
of the argument, that criticism will suffice, and we
shall pass from the statement of the finite God idea
as we have it in this logical atomist, to the state-
ment of it as we find it in the spiritual or personal-
istic atomists, G. H. Howison and J. MoT. E. McTaggart.
In Howison especially there is offered a
unique setting for God finite. Howison is a pluralist,
and maintains the existence of a harmonious society of
minds, each self-existent, self-active, and absolutely
real. This society is made up of Sod the perfect
Being, and men the imperfect beings, who are of suf-
ficient number to represent every degree of possible
( 2 )divergence from the ideal. K J There is a great
difference between God and man. but it is not that
God is infinite, and man finite. Rather in a true
sense are all spirits infinite, "infinity being a
synonym for eternity or self-existence" ;
*
3
^ we must
seek our distinction in the fact that "man possesses
a sensuous consciousness which God lacks". None of
these being3 owe3 his existence to any other; "all
are alike eternal, ultimate, irreducible realities".
(1) Of. above.
(2) Limits of Evolution, pp. 35:; -56.
(3) Says, op. cit., p. 422, "Eternity, self-existence,
self-activity, freedom and infinity are to me all inter-
changeable terms".
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Thus God is the ideal op standard by which they measure
themselves, and not their creator. Moreover, nature
is not created by God but owes its reality to human
minds. And yet, nature is not a multiplicity of
separate, unrelated and wholly diverse worlds; nature
is one because of the harmony of all spirits in the
possession of a common ideal towards which they are
all striving. So, in his universe of eternal
spirits independent of God, Kowison relieves God com-
pletely from the authorship of the evil in the world.
God, he says, is responsible only for the good which
gradually arises in the world; and even for this
good only in chief and not solely, for to every mind
that promotes the good and helps to check the evil
belongs indefeasibly the credit of his part in the
( 2
)
increase of good and the decrease of evil. ; His
belief in an ultimate moral order he bases on the
autonomy of the individual mind; the moral life de-
mands freedom, and genuine freedom is not possible
if God be the creator of men "any more than he be the
great All, of which men are but parts or expressions".
Briefly, my criticism of Howison is that I think he
mistakes the real meaning of freedom in making it
incompatible v/ith creation, for his "freedom" is of
(1) op. cit., 325-26.
(2) ibid., p. 392.
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the extremist type, existent only in realms of purest
theory, and removed afar from the world of our exper-
ience. Nowhere in life is it possible to find such
a "genuine freedom" as he seeks. Further, what is
there to assure this ultimate moral order; how shall
we arrive at any Weltanschauung by travelling in this
direction? What reason is there for having any G-od
at all? God as the central member of divine society,
but a primus inter pares , meets few needs in our
thinking, and like the five or more equine toes
of yore it is entirely conceivable that in the evolu-
tionary march of thought, and following the universal
law of disuse, that member of society may be entirely
done away with. And then, lastly but perhaps most
important, is it not just as difficult - if really
not more difficult - to conceive of a society of
eternally existing selves, as to conceive one eternal-
1;/ existing self as the world-ground? On the former
basis I certainly can see no assurance that these
eternally existing selves can ever attain to that
ethical ideal set for them, for have they not already
had from eternity to attain it, and is it not still
infinitely far in the distance?
(1) Of course, it permits a part solution of the prob-
lem of evil, and provides after a fashion for the status
of nature.

(38)
But we might multiply such, questions by the
score and receive no satisfactory answer. Let us
therefore go on and sketch briefly the views of
J. McT. E. McTaggart, another personalistic atomist.
That the universe is one of finite selves, so far he
agrees with Howison; but as to God's status in the
universe, he is not in agreement with that author.
In fact, we may well question whether McTaggart's
view is properly to be considered under the heading
of a finite God, for at a certain point in his reason-
ing his respect for God grows even less than that ex-
hibited by Gomte who took great pleasure in "politely
bowing the Deity out of the universe". But of the
possible God-hypo theses, this is least bad. The
doctrine of a non-omnipotent God a "person who fights
for the good and may be victorious" ... "is better than
the doctrine of an omnipotent person to whom good and
evil are equally pleasing"
.
v ; But this God is non-cre-
( 3
)
ative, so why believe in him at all when we have
no reason? God, if that is the term we choose to use,
is decidedly finite, and, on the basis of McTaggart's
reasoning, rather an otiose accompaniment in our
(1) As developed especially in his Gome Dogmas of
Religion . *
K'<>,) Gome' Dogma 3 of Religion, i,p. :yo ff.
"3) op. cit., p. 260.
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thinking ; although, of course, says he, non-belief
in him might make some difference but "only because
there would, be one less person to love in the universe",
with a consequent slight bearing on our happiness. So,
although customary classification designates McTaggart
as an exponent of the finite God idea, his conclusions
seem to me so negative as to do away entirely with an
idea of any real God. For discussion of such theism -
if theism it may be called - there hardly remains a
necessity.
Another form taken by the finite-God theory
is that one found in the thought of Mr. L. T. Hobhouse.
While his system itself is fundamentally very different
from that expounded by William James, his theory of
God exhibits no such striking differences. ~.7e see
purpose about us, and the existence of purpose, so
far as our experience and reasoning powers permit us
to go, implies a mind commensurate with that purpose.
Such a mind must be, therefore, a permanent and central
fact in that universe - in short God. As we think of
this mind one negative limitation is clear. "The mind
that we are led to contemplate must neither be confused
with the w ole of things nor with an Omnipotent Creator
of things. It Is not, the whole, for mechanism - the
(1) Development and i'urpose, p. 3G5.
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antithesis of purpose - runs through the structure
of the whole, and in dependence on mechanism, discord
and evil. It is not, therefore, to be confounded with
the Absolute or Unconditioned of Metaphysics. If these
terms have meaning, they possess it only as applied to
the whole, and in the whole Mind is only a factor. It
is conditioned as its purpose is conditioned. For the
same reason Mind — - is not the omnipotent Providence
of a more elementary religious theory working at its
will in a void or on a material of perfect plasticity.
The reality of evil must be recognized as something
very different from a mere privation of good. Its
extent is the measure of the incompleteness of the order
actually achieved by Mind in the world. The callous-
ness of nature, evil in general, is the "outcome of the
blind operation of mechanical forcesV .
(
2 ) Thus from
two opposite starting points we have arrived at the
conception of "a conditioned purpose as constituting
the core of the world process ".
(
3
) (l) in our analysis
of thought we come upon the conception of the Reason
"as an impulse to secure harmony of conceptions, an
impulse which can only be finally validated by develop-
ment". (4) "The analysis of the ethical consciousness
(1) op. cit., p. 367.
(2) (3) ibid., p. 363
(4) ibid., p. 369.
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points to a goal of effort in which the harmony of all
conscious life is to be attained" . Thus we are led
to conceive the world-process as a development of organic
harmony through the extension of control by Mind operat-
ing under mechanical conditions which it comes "by de-
grees to master 1 '. ' God or the World Mind is, there-
fore, finite. "Thile Professor Hobhouse does introduce
the comparatively new element of evolutional harmony,,
we shall not stop here, for criticism of his view, for
such criticism is either implicit or explicit in what
has come before and vhat is yet to come.
(3
)
Dr. Hastings Rashdall is also led to a
finite God by reason of the evil that is in the universe.
His theory is, however, in such outstanding contrast to
most of those hitherto advanced that it commends itself
far more to thinking minds. For Dr. Rashdall God is
he upon whom all beings are dependent.^ We may also
(1) ibid., D. 369.
(2) ibid., p. 372
(3) I am taking time here only very briefly to sketch
that view which he has developed in such detail. Gf.
hi3 Philosophy & Religion
, pp. 79-86; his essay, "Per-
sonality, Human and Divine" in Personal Idealism
, and
Book III of his The Theory of Good and L'vil, qsd. pp.
211-246; 236-294; 335-356". '.Vhile his development of
the idea is worthy of far more extended treatment, his
fundamental position is so much like that of Bishop
McConnell»s, of which later we write at length, that
this outline must suffice here.
(4) For discussion of all these points, Cf. Bishop
McConnell.
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think of him as being responsible for the world. v '
But as we look about this world and see the vast amount
of physical and moral evil in it, we cannot think that
such a v/orld would or could have been intrinsically
.villed by a perfectly good and perfect being such as
(2)
we believe C-od to be. Therefore this world must be
but instrumental, serving in some way as means to a
future end. That the present world is no better than
it is, is due to the fact that God, though knowing all
possible choices and their consequences, yet was so
limited that, of the various choices which presented
themselves, he could onl:/ take the best that seemed
(3)possible to him. v ' We cannot question his ethical
perfection;^ nevertheless, he is somehow limited,
and this must be from the standpoint of power.
^
But - and here we find the essential element in Dr.
Rashdall's view - these limitations were not imposed
( 6
)
upon him from without;*1 ; these necessities "to which
even God mu3t submit' 1 are parts of his essential nature.
They"prevent him from willing a universe in which all
the good that will ultimately fee gained in this uni-
verse might have been gained without the evil which
now exists". So Dr. Rashdall'3 conclusion is this:
"V/e may still say, if we please, that God is infinite
because he i3 limited by nothing outside of ;-iis own
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) For discussion of all these points,
Of. bishop KcConnell.
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nature, except what he himself has caused. v ' We can
still call him omnipotent in the sense that he possess-
es all the power there is". Thus Dr. Rashdall at times
comes very near to our viewpoint, that is, if only he
were to assert that C-od is consciously self-limited,
rather than assuming this limitation to be due to
some defective necessity in his nature. But of this
more later - in our discussion of the view as given
its most significant expression in America through
Bishop Francis J. McConnell.
Before passing, however, to that view, we
must consider in relative detail the view which we
find in Mr. H. G. Wells, who has done much to give
the theory its status in the popular thought of the
da?/, who has made it the common property of that
manifold individual, the "man-on-the-street" . Mr,
Wells has developed in this theory to which, "by the
way, he has devoted the whole of one book^ and
(4-parts of two earlier ones v u a pet hobby which at
times he rides hard and fast.
To one reading Mr. ..ell's God the Invis ible
King with the really serious intent of gaining posi-
tive and constructive knowledge of the subject in
(1) For discussion of all these points, Cf. Bishop
McConnell.
(2) Rashdall, "Personality Human and Divine", in Personal
Idealism, p. 35.
(3) if. G. Veils, God the Inv i sible King .
(4) First r,nO. LaotnTTTng s, and Ur. brittllng Sees it Through
:
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hand - to such a one I ofttimes wonder that the same
feeling does not come which G-oethe once had when he
had finished reading something of Lord Byron's - if .
we are to credit the statement of one of his biograph-
ers as true .' - "Sobald er reflektiert, ist er ein Kind" I
But let us return to the definite theory
with which we, in this paper, are to deal. Family
trees of ideas, as well as of people must needs "be of
interest in any historical study . In Mr . Well's
theological genealogy we find two lines of descent
back to David Hume. Time and time again we find him
acknowledging his intellectual and theological in-
debtedness to William James; and William James to
John Stuart Mill;' 1 ' and John Stuart Mill through his
father to David Hume. And in reading the works of
Samuel Butler (the third) one can but often be struck
with the very evident similarity of ideas - a sim-
ilarity ofttime3 so great as to lead to the hypothesis
of :,borrowed ideas" on the part of Mr. '.Veils. ^
And if such a view of the genesis of some of Mr.
Well's statements be not at fault, it is but a step
from Samuel Butler to Hume as his intellectual ances-
tor .
(1) vid. the dedication of James's Pragmatism, quoted
above
.
(2) I notice that Professor Beckwith in his " Idea of
God" (pp. 213-219) makes a like suggestion.
'

(45)
If we may be permitted a preliminary criti-
cism of Mr. Wells - does not every chapter, even some-
times every page, of ftod the Invisible .Ling seem
to be a polemic directed against any and all existing
forms of religion, rather than a logical defence of
any religion at all? Usually behind such torrential
attacks we find a cause, and for this cause in Mr.
Well's life we need look no further than his book.
His childhood conception of God was far from a joyful
one, for he says of God, i!He and his Hell Y/ere the
nightmare of my childhood; I hated him whle I still
believed in him, and who could help but hate? I
thought of him as a fantastic monster, perpetually
spying, perpetually listening, perpetually waiting to
condemn and to strike me dead - his flames as ready
as a grill-room fire. He was over me and about my
feebleness and silliness as a child as the sky and
sea would be about a child drowning in mid-Atlantic.
When I was still only a child of thirteen, by the
grace of the true God in me, I flung this lie out of
my mind, and for many years, until I came to see that
God himself had done this thing for me, the name of
God meant nothing to me but the hideous scar in my
heart where a fearful demon had been". ^ i 3 it to
(1) II. G
.
'.Veils, God the Invisible King
,
p. 44.
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be at all wondered at that a person who had had such
an experience of God would seek and accept almost any
theory which was as far removed from the God of his
childhood as possible? God, the infinite, transcendent
and vet immanent Being, had all these connotations for
Mr. Wells; quite naturally. God as a fellow-worker and
striver, a sort of democratic "big-brother" individual
v/ould hold, out a mighty appeal to his God-starved na-
ture .
His theory we can no more than outline here.
He makes a sharp distinction between God the Creator,
the "Veiled Being", and God the Redeemer, "the Captain
of mankind and of the cause of righteousness".^
His position as regards the former is one of complete
agnosticism; as regards the latter it is one of "entire
faith" . Our religion cannot go back to the ultimate
cause of the universe; only the living forces now at
work can be a part of a true religion. All theistic
metaphysics is barren and bankrupt, but we have left
a real religious faith which admits of a God who "is
neither all-wise, nor all-powerful, nor omnipotent"
.
'
2 )
Thus Mr. Y/ell's religion is wholly empirical in its
outlook, and - like much attempted empiricism - narrow
in its scope. His God i3 a person "who himself struggle
in his great effort from strength to strength, and ha3
(1) op. cit., Introduction, XII.
(2) Ibid., p. 24.
II
-
-
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no spite against error", and who "far beyond halfway
hastens to meet the purblind". "Ofod comes to us with-
in and takes us for his own; he incorporates us with
his own undying experience and adventure; he receives
us and gives himself. He is a stimulant; he makes us
live imortally and more abundantly. I have compared
him to the sensation of a dear, strong friend who
comes and stands quietly beside one, shoulder to
shoulder"
.
^ !,God is synthetic reality".^
God, too, is youth with progress ahead of him, who
"faces the blackness of the Unknown and the blind joys
and confusions and cruelties of Life, as one who leads
men through a dark jungle to a great conquest" ,
^
5 )
God is gathering power as he goes along for the con-
quest of death; every moment active and moving, but
not like the accepted figure of Jesus, which "in-
stinct with meek submission, is not in the tone of
our worship" . "We of the new faith repudiate the
teaching of non-resistance. We are the militant fol-
lowers of the participators in a militant God. We
can appreciate *md admire the greatness of Christ,
this gentle being upon whose nobility the theologians
(1) op. cit., p. 39
(2) ibid., p. 62
(3) ibid., p. 96
(4) ibid., p. 101.
-
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trade. But submission is the remotest quality of all
from our God, and a moribund figure is the cornpletest
inversion of his likeness as we know him". We
might multiply quotations and instance-^ from Mr. Wells
by the score. We read, and young and active, are per-
haps for the moment almost carried away by its appeal
to action, to progress, for aid in carrying out the
great adventure of faith. If so, let us stop for a
moment to consider whither we are going. To what
end is all this progress? For the conquest of death,
is the reply. But, having become conquerors, then
what? And this time we receive no answer. The life of
activity would conceivably cease, and what of us then?
Or any number of things may happen. God isn't
all-powerful, or all-wise, or all-anything. He is
"even as you and I", ever struggling - struggling
with might and main to conquer the dark jungles of
the future. What is there to assure us that these
jungles won't someday swallow up our God and us?
",7hat then? '.'.hat would the struggle have availed?
That is something which Mr. Wells cannot answer.
'o - we must have something other, something more
then this God who is but a fraction more than man,
even though we may not know him so well as Mr. Wells
would have us know him. Rather with Tennyson -
(1) ibid., p. 103-
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"I stretch lame hands of faith and grope
And gather dust and chaff and call
To what I feel is Lord of all,
And faintly trust the larger hope".
Mr. Well's view is, I fear, too much akin
to \ihat Feuerbach calls the objectivication of his own
(2)desires, and has not with it enough of the objec-
tivity which comes with reality. In his impatience
with Metaphysics as he conceives it, he forgets that
there are certain intellectual demands, as that for
coherence, made upon our religious attitudes. He does
not^ 3 ) come in his thinking to any Grenzbegrif
f
which
is at all related with God. Rather he seems to prefer
being left with an ultimate and irreconcilable duality
the God of religion and the Veiled Being, who must
needs occasionally come into conflict; who must often,
in some measure at least, seen to contradict each
other. Indeed, he is so out spoken as to tell us that
with this view he is satisfied, even while recognizing
it3 inherent contradictions J But v/hether or no he
Will have coherence in his own thinking, the principle
of coherence stands in the universe, and before its
(1) opening section of In l.lernoriam
.
(2) Of. the suggestion made above in regard to Mill -
and "his rationalization of his antipathies".
(3) We arrived at the same criticism of Hume and Mill
in the beginning of t;hi3 paper.
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judgment bar we find his theory condemned. Truth
remains in spite of Mr. Wells 1 But we must no longer
tarry here.
Before passing to a discussion of Bishop
McDonnell 1 s very significant expression of the finite
G-od idea, let us note the few brief statements of the
theory which we find in British and American periodi-
cal literature of the last two decades.
In the Hibbert Journal^ for July, 1911,
Sir Oliver Lodge has written an article, "The Christian
Idea of God", in which, while he does not specifically
make use of either of the terms "finite" or "limited"
as applied to God, he really defends such a view.
"The universe is a flux, it is a becoming, it is a
progress. Evolution is a reality. True and not
imaginary progress is possible. Effort is not a sham.
Existence is a true adventure. There is real risk....
( 2
)
he tells us. Indeed, "there was a real risk
about creation - directly it went beyond the inert
and mechanical. The granting of choice and free will
involved a ri3k. Thenceforward things could go wrong.
They might be kept right by main force but that would
not be pla:/ing the game, that would not be loyalty to
(1) Hibbert Journal, IX, 607-716.
(2) op. cit., p. 714.
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(1) Good Is the end andthe conditions 11
aim of the Divine Being; hut not without conditions.
Not by compulsion. Perfection, as of machinery,
would he too dull and low an achievement - something
much higher is sought. The creation of free creatures
who, in so far as they go right, do so because they
will, not because the:/ must - that was the divine
problem, and it is the highest of which we have any
conception 1 ' . ,! there was a real risk in
making a human race on this planet. Ultimate good
was not guaranteed " the
struggle is a real one. The effort is not confined
to humanity alone; according to the Christian con-
ception; God has shared in it Ay, that is
the Christian conception; not of a God apart from his
creatures, looking on, taking no personal interest in
their behavior, sitting aloof only to judge them; but
one who anxiously takes measures for their betterment,
takes trouble, takes pains - a pregnant phrase, takes
pains, - one who suffers when they go wrong, one who
feels painfully the miseries and wrongdoings and sins
and cruelties of the creatures whom he has endowed
with free will; one who actively enters in to the
(1) ibid
(2) ibid
(3) ibid
p. 714.
p. 715.
p. 715.
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storm of the conflict " That is Sir Oliver
Lodge's "idea of God" - a view which, by the way,
is not at all unlike that of Bishop McConnell, which
we shall discuss in its detail later.
Again the Hibbert Journal for 1913 ' we
have a further expression of the idea, this time,
however, from the pen of an American, H. A. Over-
street. With the passing of the years, says he,
new habits of social thought have been gradually
replacing our old ones. There have also been sig-
nificant changes in biological thought. Comparing
the two, we reach the conclusion that the fundamen-
tal way of democracy; "the self-modification of the
mass - life by the actions and reactions of all its
(3)
members"; is the fundamental way of all life.
Therefore, we come finally to a "philosophy fashioned
in the spirit of democratic - biological ideals",
which "will inevitably repudiate whatever of monarch-
ic or oligarchic still lingers in the God - views of
the present" . ^ 4 ^ 5 ^ a great democratic society, a
va3t "federal union", will be the "large figure",
(1) op. cit., p. 715.
(2) Hibbort Journal, XI (1913), 394-411.
(3) op. cit., p. 406.
(4) ibid., p. 403.
(5) For discussion of this Cf. under Reeman's view.
i
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"not simply of human but of cosmic society, which is
to yield our God of the future. There is no
place in it for the figure of an eternally perfect be-
ing, and no need: no need, for the vast society by its
own inherent mass - dialectic - of struggle and adapta-
tion, co-operation and conflict - is working out its own
destiny; no place, for the society, domocratic from
end to end, can brook no such radical class dis-
tinction as that between a supreme Being favored
with eternal and absolute perfection, and the mass
of beings doomed to the lower v/ays of imperfect
struggle nor is it indeed a God, as idealis-
tic absolutists would have it, in whom our imper-
fect actions vanish in perfection, but one in whom
they are the means whereby, out of an imperfect
present, a less imperfect future is being wrought.
It is a God that in one respect is in the making,
.
growing with the growth of the world; suffering and
sinning and conquoring with it; a God, in short,
that _is the world in the spiritual unity of its
mass - life"-- -- !'a God in and of the total world-
n (1)process"
.
For the statement of the idea in American
periodical literature we are indebted primarily, -
indeed, I believe, solely, - to the American
(1) Overotreet, op. cit., p. 410.
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Journal of Theology. In volume XI (1907) of that
Journal^ we find an article by H. W. Wright, "An
Immutable Absolute or a God V/ho Strives?", in which
he holds that the belief in an Absolute Reality,
perfect and complete, which may satisfy us from the
theoretical point of view is far from satisfactory
to the moralist, "for it takes all meaning out of
that moral struggle which from the point of view
of ethics constitutes the heart and core of human
(2)
life". "T/hat if we even conclude that reality
must, by necessity of its nature, remain unfinished
and imperfect?" He goes on further to point out
that there is an important doctrine in the teachings
of Christianity which is in fundamental agreement
with this conception of an imperfect Reality - an
idea of a suffering, self-sacrificing God, which
can hardly be reconciled with the idea of infinite
power and complete self-sufficiency; and further,
that the "practical value of such a view is as easy
( ^
)
to recognize as its theoretical defects". ;
Again in Volume XIX of the American Journal
we have another expression of the same view by
Kawaguchi Ukichi in his article, "The Doctrine of
(1) American Journal of Theology, XI, pp. 123-150
(2) op. Cit., p. 123
(3) op. cit., 129
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Evolution and the Conception of God". Mr. Ukichi
arrives at his conclusion by a somewhat different
route, however , than do most of his fellow defenders
of the faith. He is an evolutionist, and as he says,
"The evolutionary view of reality stands for the
relative and finite view of all reality. God, from
this evolutionary view of the world, is to he con-
ceived in terms of change and growth, the essential
characteristics of the living world with which he
(2)is vitally related." "This conception of God in
terms of* evolutionary experience, rather than under
the category of some metaphysical absolute, is de-
manded by our religion and ethics
The God demanded by practical religion must be a
being who shares in our struggles, conflicts, fail-
ures, successes, victories from the point
of view of ethics we need such a God.'M<~ ; He
quotes^ with approval Hflffding's words, "If Be-
ing were finished harmoniously and unchangeably,
ethics would be impossible. All ethics demands
that there be effort. But there would be no room
(1) American Journal of Theology, XIX, (1915) 550-576.
(2) oo. cit., p. 570.
(3) ibid., p. 572.
(4) ibid., p. 573.
*
(56)
for effort if everything were in eternal and actual
completeness! 1 ; and concludes "But thus to bring
relativity and becoming into the very being of God
means, of course, that we must abandon that absolute
ground of religious and ethical assurance which is
believed to be given us by traditional conceptions
of God as the absolute controller of the world and
human life. An evolving God does not guarantee be-
forehand the ultimate success of our moral universe
(2)
' This alone is "a tenable conception
of God in an age of evolutionary science". c)
In the article by ?. H. Foster, "Some
(4)
Theistic implications of bergs on T s Philosophy"
we have still another expression of the belief in
a finite God - and. I believe, we may consider this
the clearest and best grounded defence of that idea
to be found in periodical literature up to the pres-
ent time. Professor Foster is apparently led to his
conclusion through a consideration of Bergson's
philosophy of change, to which he feels that too
little attention ha3 been given by the theologians.
Certain difficulties seem to insurmountable on the
old basis of an unchanging static God; v/e are lost
(1) H8ffding: The problems of phi losophy
,
p. 151.
(8) Kawaguchi UklchT, op. cit., p. b73.
(3) ibid., p. 576.
(4) American Journel of Theology , XXII (1918), 274 - 299.
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in a hopeless maze in the realm of causation on that
basis; further, how can the existence of sin and
pain in the world he reconciled with the omnipotence
(2)
and perfect goodness of such a God; x ' again, the
static view of God directly attacks and renders -
"not merely logically, hut, alas, in most frequent
and concrete actuality" - spiritual religion impossi-
(3)hie, v ' for how can there he suffering in an unchang-
ing God? It is on these bases that Foster finds
himself prepared to accept the "suggestion derived
from Bergson that God is himself by his very nature
not a static but a progressing Being, one himself
passing through an evolution, or essentially a
Becoming", ^ and to maintain that when Bergson
does speak concerning religion "he will identify
(
5
)
the Vital Impulse directly with God". ; "The im-
perfection of the Vital Impulse (that "upward moving
force, imperfect in power, uncertain as to methods,
struggling toward a great end, itself enlarging as
it goes") must be God's own imperfection, if he
is morally in earnest with this world, that is, if
(1) op. cit., pp. 277-5.
(2) ibid., p. 278.
(3) ibid., p. 279.
(4) ibid., p. 250.
(5) Ibid., p. 282.
(6) ibid., p. 282.
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lie is God" . * ' The imperfections in this world
necessitate, therefore, a developing World-Builder,
and this necessitates a developing God. Further to
defend his point, Professor Foster asks the question,
".Thy should not power grow "by exercise? ; and in his
reply, incorporates what Wundt formulated as a law
of the universe - "spiritual energy tends to in-
(2)
crease". K 1 So,' says Foster, "Now God is spiritual
energy; and if this, as Wundt says, tends of its
very nature to increase, then God is a Becoming by
virtue of his very nature as spiritual - living".
^
Our problem here is "not one of origins hut only
•• (4)
of existence". In the concluding pages of his
a.rticle he attempts to answer what seems to him
would be the most cogent objection to the idea of
a constantly changing God; that is, that there would
be tremendous difficulties involved in knowing such
a God. "Knov/ledge of a changing reality is not un-
certain or unreal, however changing, if at each
point it corresponds to the reality existing at that
( 5
)
point". Indeed, he goes on to say, - and I
(1) ibid., p. 233.
(2) 7,'undt: System der Philosophle
. p. 315
(3) Foster, op. Clt.
,
p. ~2"3~9
(4) ibid., p. 290.
(5) ibid., p. 292.
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"believe rightly - when we reach bed-rock in this
matter it is not God's '"unchangeability" which we
need but his "reliability". So he concludes;
nBut what beauty is added even to the idea of God's
glory, by the proposed view of God as Progress J
Power ever increases. God, not in manifesting him-
self, but in doing, in exercising his powers for
the good that may thereby be gained, struggles with
a task at first too mighty for him. ....
The Creator is not yet the absolutely successful
Govenor of his creation" .
(
2
) We shall not pause
here for criticism of this view - for much of that
criticism is implied in what has come before, and
the remainder will come in our discussion of Bishop
McConnell ' s theory of a finite God, at which we
t
shall soon arrive.
Both the Eibbert Journal and the American
Journal of Theology have, therefore, been influential
in popularizing this idea of a finite God which has,
within the past decade especially, come to hold so
prominent a place in religious thinking.
Further progress has been made in bringing
the idea to the attention of that rather well-known
individual, the "average man", by the Reverend Edmund
H. Reeman, a Unitarian clergyman, in his book,
(1) ibid., p. 295.
(2) ibid., p. 298.
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Do We Heed a New Idea of God? - a book which., by the
way, well expresses the tendency of much of the more
or less superficial thought of the day. Mr. Heeman'
viewpoint is quite akin to that of Mr. H. G. Wells
,
discussed in kn earlier connection. Indeed, meta-
physically, I believe his treatment of the subject
has almost all the defects of Mr. Wells position in
God the Invisible Hing ; consequently, our criticism
of the latter will serve somewhat as a criticism of
the former as well. However, his exposition of the
theory has been of not a little influence, and has
in itself some value, so perhaps it will be well to
consider in some detail his viewpoint.
Mr. freeman' s whole volume is a plea for
a restatement of religion "in terms of democratic
outreach". Of this new theory we must not be
afraid for "God is what he always was our
(2)
changing conceptions do not change realities .
In forming a conception of God however, which is
more akin to reality, we must face certain facts
and correlate them v/ith our view of God. One of
these facts which seems especially to bear on the
author's thinking is the Great ,'ar, in the throes
of v/hich the whole world wa3 involved at the time
he wa3 writing his book. So he asks the question,
(1) Reeman; Do V/e Need a Hew Idea of God? , p. 4.
(2) op. cit., pT"TZ
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"Can God always do the thing that needs to be done?
Is he a being of both unlimited goodness and unlimit-
ed power? "(-^ The answer to this must be sought,
and can only be found - if at all - in the facts of
life and experience as we know them. "It can hardly
be disputed that we have the right to expect of an
Almighty Being possessed of the power to do all
things, and by nature supremely good, that he will
use his power to overcome the evil, to root it out
from his world, and to further goodness by every
possible means. We expect so much of men, can we
(
2
)
expect less of God?
"
v
' He then reverts to the sub-
ject of the Great War. "Do you mean to tell me that
there is a God who could end it all tomorrow if he
wished, but that he wont? I cannot believe it, and
if I could I do not think I should have much use for
such a God anyhow."^ Therefore we must face the
facts and reach some conclusion concerning God's
relation to the world. There are four possibilities
from which we can choose: "Either God is good but
not omnipotent - that is, loves the good and wants
to further it but is just about as helpless to sweep
evil av/ay at one stroke as we ourselves are; or that
(1) ibid., p. 17.
(2) ibid., p. 23.
(3) ibid., pp. 24-25.
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God is omnipotent but not good - that is, has the
power to destroy evil from the fact of the earth,
"but not the will; or again, what we call good is
not the real good as God sees it (which would mean,
of course, that all our notions about good and evil
are entirely mistaken and that we are quite in the
dark as to what real goodness actually is): or
fourthly, that God has no concern with mankind and
no interest in what happens to us. For the life of
me I can see no other alternative that will fit the
difficulty, if we are to keep the essential elements
of the older ideas of God. And since I cannot es-
cape the thought of God and am compelled to believe
that in the main humanity is not mistaken in its
ideas of goodness, and since I cannot believe that
a God exists who is indifferent to creation and the
interests of mankind, I am forced to the one con-
clusion left, namely, that God is actually now doing
the best he can and can't do better, and that in all
the struggle his interests are as much at stake as
humanity's"
/
1)
In brief criticism of his acceptance
of the alternative which seems best to him, let us
point out that he seems to limit God by 3ome sort of
power or necessity more or less without himself;
(1) Ibid., pp. 25-26.
• -
ft
2 J -
-
:
•
••
!
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that, in short, he errs in his conception of power
.
v
He does not seem to consider at all the possibility
of a God who is self-limited.
Once having accepted this alternative he
goes on further to defend it, first of all on the
grounds of democracy. i! democracy ....... .is
(2)
the coming thing" ....... ... "is the negation of
monarchy as much in religion as in politics".
Therefore, "When a nation( America) that has thus
repudiated monarchy in government takes time to re-
flect, it will surely not "be long before it sees
the practical impossibility of retaining in theology
(3)
what it has felt bound to reject in politics".
That is, God must change with the national constitu-
tion, and since monarchy is no longer fashionable,
a monarchial God must go ! Exactly how we may con-
ceive this democratic God who is to be the monarch's
successor, we are left in doubt. Of course, he is
to be a God for the people; possibly, broadly speak-
ing of the people; and as some would have it. even
by the people. But after all, we must face the fact
that, whether or no we will have it, we do not,
cannot elect God I Indeed, when we come to think
(1) Of. our previous discussion, J. 3. Mill and
F. C. S. Gchiller.
(2) op. cit., p. 35.
(3) ibid., p. 79.
-
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clearly about it, is it not "rather trivial for an
enlightened, modern civilization to take the consti-
tution of the United. States as a model for the con-
stitution of the Kingdom of Heaven"? v ; of course,
our idea of God must and. does have in it elements
of what we today call democracy - that is, we think
of God as a Father, and further as a Father who
respects the moral autonomy of his children. But
that is far from being all of the story. As
Professor E. S. Brightrnan has well said, "We may as
well face the fact that the universe in general and
religion in particular contain some undemocratic
factors We all stand face to face with facts that
we cannot prevent or control; our very existence de-
pends on a power not ourselves. If God is immanent
in nature, as seems most reasonable to believe, he
is a God of force, not waiting on human preferences.
We must accept the universe whether it suits the
1 2 )
majority or not." v ;
How, then, he goes on to ask, can we har-
monize the relation of God, "conceived as the Life-
Force of the universe to this new world movement
that we call democracy?
",
( 3
}
and he answers the
(1) E
.
S. Brightrnan, "The Meanin of Obligation", p. 67.
(2) ibid., p. 63.
(3) Reeman, op. cit., p. 100.

(65)
question in this way, " it is identical with, his
general relation to the viaole cosmic process and
progression You can no more separ-
ate God, if he be the Life-Force of the universe,
from democracy than you can separate him from the
ethical qualities and spiritual ideals that have
come to "birth in the human mind ,! . " so then
it "becomes no less true to say that God is democracy
than that God is love".^^ Mr. Reeman up to this
point has, implicitly at least, "been defending a
doctrine of divine immanence; at this point he lets
that divine immanence tumble head over heels into
a sort of democratic pantheism, which, if he were to
carry it to its logical conclusion, would defeat his
primary purpose in writing his book. However, let
us give him credit for at least verbally disposing
of the relation of the Life-Force or what Mr. V/ells
would call the "Veiled Being", to the God we know
in religion. He aims at a sort of unity, in that
way trying to escape the fundamental duality into
which his English contemporary falls.
In his chapter, "The God of the Struggle",
^
(1) ibid., p. 101.
(2) Ch. V, pp. 123-146
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he discusses some concrete instances of human suffer-
ing and. says, nDo you tell me that with unlimited
powers for creating a universe and bringing manhood
to being, and with no necessity for choosing the
way of struggle and travail, God yet did choose the
fearsome means and sanctioned a nature 'red in tooth
and claw', and a struggle the unutterable anguish of
which no human mind can fully conceive?" He conclud-
es consequently, "How else then can we think of God
than as the God of a mighty struggle, and of a con-
stant effort and persistent outreach? If the struggle,
of the universe has not been permitted by God but is
rather an inevitable struggle, then it must mean some-
thing to God, and God must be winning something by it
that would not otherwise have been possible. If God
is really the God of our universe if he stands
in any close and vital relation whatsoever with the
world of men and things, why then, he must be the
God of the struggle". In the main what we have said
about Mr. H. G. '.Veils will apply here as well, but
let us consider one further point. Mr. Rseman feels
that if the struggle has nob been permitted by God,
it must somehow mean more to him. I merely raise
(1) Here again he falls into the error noted above
;
see also the discussion of J. S. Mill and Schiller!
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the counter question, must it not mean infinitely
more to God if he is conscious of having permitted
such a struggle with full realization of what it
must mean to those creatures whom he loves in order
that those creatures might work out their own salva-
tion, might attain as free moral "beings true life
for themselves? That indeed, would place God far
higher in the moral scale - and, I should say_,
reckoning it from the standpoint of cost as Mr.
Reeman wishes, costs God infinitely more - in suf-
fering, in realization of responsibility, in will.
This good and moral God who feels so deeply his
responsibility to his creatures that he is willing
to let them suffer in order to attain real personal
life, would I believe harmonize quite as well with
Mr. Reeman' 3 arguments from the practical consequences
of the belief, on which J. S. Mill, William James
H. G. Wells and others far too numerous to mention
have also placed such emphasis. Any statement of
religion in terms of challenge is in a way valuable
if we are shaken out of our rather self-satisfied
spiritual and moral inertia, and of course the idea
of a God who needs - indeed, can't get along without
our help, offers a tremendous challenge and stimulus
to us which, especially if we have - as most of us
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in this generation have - heard on every hand talk
about a social attitude, human brotherhood, service
and the like, are eager to accept. But I wonder
sometimes if much of the appeal isn't after all to
our own vanity and self-satisfaction, for quite
naturally it leaves us with a good feeling to think
that we have been helping so important a being as
God out of a rather tight place. That, I think, is
one of the motives for so extensive popular accept-
ance of this idea in some quarters
.
Over against such a conception let me
place the idea of a God such as I have described
above. The challenge is there too - and perhaps
an even greater challenge. God, knowing fully what
it would mean, yet is so truly moral, truly good,
that he is willing to permit the struggle, to
participate through his boundless sympathy in the
terrible suffering in the lives of his creatures
in order that those creatures may have the truest
moral life. He is willing to put so far off the
realization of that Kingdom which he would have
come in men's lives, because he is a moral God who
loves his creatures. He is willing now to forego
much of the joy and feeling of companionship he
would probably have in a race of creatures who

(69)
lived more in accordance with his holy will. There
is something about a great sacrifice, about loving
suffering of that sort that appeals to the highest
motives of our beings - and I think that it is here
that the real challenge will be found in our idea
of G-od. Can we, as God's creatures, be even self-
respecting and yet add more and more to what it has
already cost God to make the world as good as it is
In the face of such overwhelming, overpowering good
ness, can we make our lives any less than the best
that is in our power? Must we not each one of us
put forth, continuously, daily, a maximum effort,
working with God and for God, towards the coming
of the Kingdom of good? If God is willing to go
to such lengths for us, can we choose less than
the best? Such a God cannot but offer a real
challenge for real effort in men's lives.
But we must not stop longer here. The
most recent and by far the most valuable exposition
of the belief in a finite God is that by Bishop
Pranci3 J. McConnell in his exceedingly significant
book, Is God Limited?^
"There is not abroad today so much of an
inclination to challenge the existence of a God",
(1) N. Y.; Abingdon Press, 1924.
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says he, "as of a desire to come to closer grips
with the terms in which the formal and orthodox
theology has sought to set the idea of God forth.
v.
:
e say that God is omnipotent, and yet in the same
breath we say that men are free. We say that God
is omniscient, "but protest that knowledge of all
things does not interfere with a free life's dis-
posing of itself as it sees fit. Moreover, what
does 'presence' mean to say nothing of omnipresence?
We sa:/ that God is 'in' all things, hut he surely
cannot be in all things in the same sense. Philoso-
phic thinkers today are impatient, if not rebellious,
toward the claims of any sort of absolutism" . ^
^
(2)Again the Great War - but a part of the whole
problem of human distress and pain - has set men
to thinking along these lines more than ever before.
In addition we have to face the whole problem of
pain in the animal world. "Even inanimate nature
is not so nearly perfect as to prevent our raising
the question as to whether a Perfect Creator can
reconcile that nature with any of hia own perfec-
ii ( 3
)
tions". ' Further, today we find a new insistence
(1) rcConnell'n Is God Limit ed^, pp. 7-3.
(2) Of. the influence of the ,.ar on H. G. V/ells and
Reeman. See above.
(3) op. cit., pp. 9, 10.
-
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upon the value of human lives, with the concomitant
question as to whether or not these lives are in
some degree independent creators. And again, we
find not only difficulties in connection with the
question of the relations of human personalities
to God, but difficulties "involved in the very
idea of personality itself". These, according to
Bishop HcConnell are some of the problems with which
we must grapple if we would answer the question upper-
most in so many minds today, "Is. God limited?".
In attempting in some measure to reply
to that question, Bishop MoConnell lets his problem
fall naturally into three parts: (1) "Are there
limitations for God in the creation of and carrying
forward of the material universe? (2) Are there
limitations for God in the creation of and in the
relation to men? (3) Are there limitations in the
very fact that we conceive of God as a person?".
And, "if there are such limitations, how are we to
conceive of them as to preserve the moral and
spiritual values which are the glory of the Christ-
ian ideal of God?"^
In what the author of Is God Limited? says
(1) op. cit., pp. 9, 10.
(2) op. cit., p. 11.

(72)
in reply to these questions, we have a most admirable
discussion of almost every argument which has "been
advanced either for or against the "belief in a finite
God - a discussion characterized by real philosophic-
al depth, withal never forgetting the needs of the
"man-on-the-street" . Carefully, accurately, inclu-
sively, Bishop McGonnell marshalls his facts; with
a mind which is exceptionally free from bias he
interprets them, trying, in so far as is humanly
possible, to take everything into account before
formulating his conclusions. The result is a theory
of God which commands intellectual respect.
For today, says he, "Christianity is more
(1)
concerned with an absolutely moral God than with
metaphysical absolutism - and probably the absolute-
ly moral God would find it necessary to work under
some actual limitations . ^^ As to how we may con-
ceive of these limitations - "It's all up in the air,
I know; but better be up in the air than in the dark.
If we get a God about whom we .just utter phrases
into which we can put only an intellectual content,
we have taken a long step toward banishing God" .
^
(1) Indeed, I think that has been the hope of the finite
God advocates from Epicurus on. It has taken a long time
for many churclanen to realize thi3, however.
(2) ibid., p. 24.
(3) Ibid., p. 55.
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It is as a protest against this God of bare abstrac-
tion, "against the metaphysician's emptying all the
concrete our of divine experience" , ^ that Bishop
McConnell expounds his view.
As it is with that view that I find myself
in fundamental agreement, I shall let much of my
discussion of Is God Limited? serve as a statement
(2)
of my ovm views as well. That I may more clearly
point out, however, what seem to he the major element
in the defence of a limited God, I shall deviate
greatly from the division of the subject matter made
by the author, and follow a somewhat different plan -
synthesizing, in some instances, arguments far apart
from each other in that book,* in other instances,
further dividing some of the material which Bishop
IJcConnell has there brought together. I shall,
nevertheless, while making the major divisions of
the subject very different, follow in so far as is
possible the order of Bishop McConnell's discussion
in my subdivisions. My discussion will fall,
(1) ibid., p. 53
(2) Man:/, indeed the major oar-t of my conclusions
were reached - in general* before the publication of
Bi3hop McConnell's book, Is God Limited?^etppeared in
the spring of 1924; my f irTITlTeTence 6T a finite God
came during the year 1923. In the discussion which
follows, where no points of disagreement are noted,
the implication v/ill be that Bishop McConnell's dis-
cussion is such that I am in fundamental agreement
with it.
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consequently, into four groups: (1) The limitations
of God which really limit him; (2) those limitations
which are of hut a formal character; (3) those
"limitations upon which, although serious on the
basis of the old theology, we do not now look as
limitations at all; and (4) the attributes of God
which remain as essential in spite of the many lim-
itations upon the Divine Being.
First of all, then, let us look at the
ways in which God really seems to be limited. Cer-
tain such limitations necessarily gro?/ out of the
relation of God to the creation of an external ma-
terial universe.
In a lucid chapter on "Relativity and
Theism",^ we find a discussion of the relation
of God to space - and incidentally an excellent ex-
ample of what Bishop I.icConnell means when he pro-
tests against the "emptying of all the concrete out
of divine experience." "In our attempt to keep God
free from hi3 subserviency to the spatial universe
which is his continuous deed we must not take him
from the s:/3tern in such fashion as to deprive him
of the vision which would confront an ordinary pair
of human eyes"* "Spatial activity may be an es-
sential to the divine Mind rooted in the nature of
(1) op. cit., Gh. II, pp. 25-44
(2) ibid., p. 42.
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mind itself". ; "In some forms of thought God
may be no more able to think unspatially than to
disregard his own nature". Nor do we "help the
thought of God's freedom when we make space unreal";
but "we may clear ourselves of some baffling limi-
tations when we attempt to define the nature of that
reality as mental. Then God is dealing not with a
vast actual space which he can never surmount nor
escape He is a thinker and a doer with part at
least of his activities taking the spatial form" . v 1
Space is, therefore, a mental form, and "we must
not think of mental forms as something that can be
put off or on like a fancied pair of spectacles"?^)
"In our struggle to free God from unworthy limita-
tions, we must not shut him out from the view which
makes the world glorious to us" He that framed
the eye, shall he not see? He that made the mind
so that it seizes the glory of the world under the
space form, shall he not have whatever vision there
is through the space form?"^ 5 ^ s God is, in that
way, limited by space.
Again, there is the relation of God to
time. we may most satisfactorily think of time,
(1) ibid., p. 42.
(2) ibid., p. 42
(3) (4)(5) ibid., p. 43.
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like space, as a mental form, and "inherent in the
nature of mental process itself".^ Time involves
change, and "it is change that makes the heart of
our perplexity". Conventional theology has held
to a timeless God, as a "protest against an ageing
or developing God, or a God likely to be taken by
surprise by the unforseen deeds of free men"
But "there remains another conceivability - that
God eternally acts and eternally, or everlastingly,
seizes the changes under a time-form essentially
like ours though immeasurably superior in grasp
and scope, or at least that he knows to the full
what before-and-after means, no matter what other
ways of knowing time he may possess".^ "If
change means anything for him - and it would seem
to mean something if being itself is activity so
largely changing - time must mean something also"! 5 ^
"The metaphysician falls back upon the unpicturable
activities of the infinite. He tells us that a
timeless world must be thought and not pictured.
Very likely the Author of thought itself can think
(1) ibid.
,
p. 45.
(2) ibid., p. 43. Cf. the evolutionary basis of the
finite God. idea as developed in the periodical liter-
ature discussed above.
(3) (4) ibid., p. 49.
(5) ibid., p. 60.
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anything that is unthinkable, but we insist that
these attempts to shut off Clod into the realm of
pure thought - the realm of changes seized by some
intellectual process of which we know nothing, while
the realm of before-and-after is merely human - we
insist, we repeat, that these views are the ones that
(1)
really limit God in an unworthy way. In Lhe at-
tempt to get an unlimited God they end by shutting
him up a good deal in the dark".'
2
) So the Divine
Being is not "timeless" and "immutable" in the words
of the old theology, and we cannot "excuse God from
experience of the before-and-after if we are not to
limit him so as to make him of little melp to us.
For him the difference between 'is' and 'was' and
( 3
)
'will be' must mean something".^ ;
Another limitation of the divine Being
growing out of that Being's relation to the material
universe is that which arises from the problem of
physical evil. From the earliest thinking about God
on down throughout the ages there has appeared off
and on the idea that God is somehow limited by
(1) '.7m. James in "The Dilemma of Determinism" (in the
volume. The V/ill to Believe, p. 131), speaks of the ide
of a divine mind which Is timeless as a "gratuitous
fiction", and develops this viewpoint further.
(2) ibid., p. 50.
(3) ibid., p. 53.
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matter. Later thought has, however, made It clear
that if we are to have any proper theism at all,
(1)
matter cannot stand apart from God. v Science tells
us that matter is force, and for the theist n the
forces are the continually put-forth energies of God.
..It follows as an immediate conclusion that.
so far as the world of matter is concerned, apart
from any question as to human freedom, there is no
way of freeing God from responsibility for physical
(2)
evil. it may, indeed, he a limitation upon God,
hut it is not a limitation upon him by something
out s ide o f hims elf " . 3 '
Bishop I.icConnell then goes on to discuss
this problem of responsibility for pain and physical
evil in general. In the world of moral agents we
can, within limits, justify pain for its educative
moral value; but - and here I do not see how anyone
can think otherwise - "pain in an animal world,
(1) Time will not permit an adequate discussion of
this essential point, so I shall here assume its
truth. i;,or a defence of this view, Cf. Bowne, Sorley,
Brightman, et al.
(2) I think Bishop I.icConnell • s frank placing of the
responsibility where it belongs is to be commended.
Contrast this with the attempt to place the responsi-
bility anywhere but on God in Voltnire, Rousseau,
Mill, Perry, Howiaon, ells, et al.
(3) op. cit., p. 53. So also Kashdall.

(79)
however, where there is no possibility of moral
utilization of pain, raises an opaque mystery", vy
of which there is no explanation in terms of our
present knowledge. Indeed, says Bishop McGonnell,
"If I desired to make an argument against the good-
ness of God- or even in behalf of atheism. I think
I would start with the utter hopelessness and mean-
inglessness, from our point of view, of animal
( 2 ) ( 3
)
pain' 1
. That would seem, therefore, to place
a serious moral limitation upon God were he limited
in no other way.
There is, however, one avenue of relief
here - one growing out of a suggestion made by
Leibniz as to the "limitations inherent in a
finite system even in the hands of an infinite work-
er".'^ Even the Infinite cannot make the finite
other than finite. " the merit of the Leibnizian
suggestion lies", consequently, "in the fact that if
we are to think of creation as at all the work of a
rational Creator, there must be some heed paid to
the requirements of system as system". ^ So God
is limited, not by a va3t and rather meaningless
(1) ibid., p. 62.
(2) ibid., p. 63.
(3) Bishop Gore in his Belief in God
,
p. 121 empha-
sizes this point.
(4) (5) ibid., p. 64.
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matter entirely outside of himself but rather by
the demands of system as system inherent in his very
being, if we are to have a coherent and understandable
universe at all, v ;
Closely connected with this argument - in-
deed I believe Bishop McConneil makes it a part of
it - we have a further limitation in God's being.
Underneath all our desire for coherence and system
is an unwillingness to have the world just the out-
come of any plan, which might conceivably have been
changed for some other. "We desire the world to
come out of the best plan, or out of something like
a plan so good that it becomes an intellectual neces-
sity to the Creator to carr?/ it out. We do not care
for a creator who shows his freedom from limitation
by trying now one plan, and now another. We like to
think of him as shut up to the best plan. The limi-
tation in such sense is the limitation of the best
itself 11
.
(2) (3)
(1) Contrast this again with the views of Voltaire,
Rousseau, Kill, Wells, et al.
(2) ibid., p. 65.
(3) Rashdall clearly recognizes this; unfortunately,
however, much loose thinking in other quarters repre-
sents God as apparently trying first one plan and then
another until he find3 the one that is best. To such
a misrepresentation of God is due, I believe, much of
the aversion to the finite God idea in general.
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"In loose popular speech we can say that God could
have done things differently. In this we merely mean
to emphasize the truth that he is not bound by a de-
terministic necessity, but the best alv/ays binds the
free chooser. The most free of beings has no choice
when he is confronted by the best" .^ of course.,
again we have here no limitation outside of God him-
self, but rather a necessity of his very being.
While we do not seek, therefore, to
minimize the limitations which the physical universe
at least seems to put upon God, we must remember that
those "limitations must be such and such only as wis-
dom calls for" .^
Nov; let us consider these limitations which
seem to be real ones for God growing out of his rela-
tion to the world of men - and especially out of the
problem of human freedom.
We must first of all assume freedom if we
are to get anywhere at all in the moral world. Of
course, that freedom we know a3 ours is far from
(1) ibid., p. 66.
(2) Contrast J. 3. Mill, Three Essays on Religion
,
p. 177, where he insists queerly enough, that wisdom
and contrivance are shown in overcoming difficulties,
and there Is no room for them in a Being for whom no
difficulties exist.
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being in any sense an absolute freedom - and yet,
limited, hedged in as it is on every hand, we must
recognize it as a prodigious force. Granting, then,
that men are free within certain limits - free to
produce if not to create outrightly - can we still
look upon the Divine Being as omnipotent? And our
reply is, in the words of Bishop McConnell, "It is
at this point of human freedom that we feel that
limitation should be made on the doctrine of divine
omnipotence.^^ Most surely we shall have to give
up the dictionary idea of omnipotence. We can see
that God can do all things except those which his
own rational and moral character make impossible,
and those which are turned over to the sphere of
the freedom of a free man's choice, the human factor
itself being the grant of the Creator, and moving
within a range of activities where the will of God
must necessarily be a cooperating fact. It is not
as if Bod could be thought of creating a will and
then allowing that will to [O its own course. The
3 0ul itself is a continuously acting agent drawing
the resources of its strength from the Divine,
".ithout aiming at knowledge too high for us we may
fairly say that in a sense a human life is two
(1) This has been especially recognized since the time
of James's emphatic insistence on the creativity of the
human will.
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interacting processes - the human and the divine - the
processes sometimes almost parallel and again somewhat
opposed hut inextricably bound up together, the choices
of the human making necessary now one type and now an-
other of divine activity". Therefore, "in the mean-
ing that human choices condition the divine activity,
there is necessarily limitation of the divine will",
and God, in this sense, is no longer omnipotent.
Is God likewise limited from the standpoint
of omniscience, we may ask? Here our conclusion is
not so certain; indeed, it seems that this age-old
debate" is about as far from settlement now as when
it was first raised".'*^ "The foreknowledge of a
free act has never been proved a contradiction,
and it has never been shown that the inability of
Divine wisdom to foresee a free choice would serious-
ly upset divine procedure. As knowing all the pos-
sibilities in the whole situation, God would seem to
be in possession of all the knowledge worth-while".
To make this point somewhat clearer, let us think
of God as Jame3 suggests in "The Dilemma of Deter-
minism", a3 a 3ort of divine chess-player.^')
(1) LIcConnell, op. clt., pp. 120-121.
(2) ibid., p. 12.3.
(3) John Stuart kill made the same statement In the 13G0
(4) James j The '.7.111 to Bolieve and OtherEssays, pp.131-
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Let us suppose two men before a chess-board, the one
a novice, the other an expert player of the game.
While the expert is certain of winning in the long
run, he cannot foresee exactly what any one actual
move of his adversary will be, although he knows all
of the possible moves of the latter, and also how to
meet each of them by a counter-move of his own which
will lead eventually to victory. On this analogy,
the novice stands for us finite free agents, and the
expert for God. There is a final end of the universe
which will mean victory for God, and yet the creator's
plan of that universe "would thus be left blank as to
many of its actual details, but all possibilities
would be marked down. The realization of some of
these would be left absolutely to chance, that is,
would only be determined when the moment of realiza-
tion came, other possibilities would be contingently
determined, that is, their decision would have to
wait till it was seen how the matters of absolute
chance fell out. But the rest of the plan, includ-
ing its final upshot, would be rigorously determined
once for all. So the Creator himself would not need
to know al l the details of actuality until they came:
and at any time his own view of the world would be a
view partly of facts and partly of possibilities
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exactly as our is now." That I believe, is the only
tenable solution of the problem of the relation of
the divine omniscience to human freedom: and I must
agree with Bishop McConnell ' s conclusion, "If any
sacrifice is to be made, I personally should prefer
the sacrifice of the divine omniscience rather than
human freedom." And "it is not irreverence to say
that God, that the God in whom we believe, knew
what he was doing when he made men free - that, if
there has been any curtailing of divine knowledge,
it was done in the very bestowal of freedom on man,
which we believe to have been a free act of God's
own will". (1)
Now that we have considered some of the
apparent limitations of God of a more metaphysical
character - i.e., those of space, of time, of system
as system, of the ideal of the best, and the questions
of God's omnipotence and God's omniscience, we shall
enter the realm of more practical experience, and
"deal with the limitations upon God from the fact
of his personal and social dealings with created
men"
.
In a striking chapter on "The Bonds of
( 2
)
Creatorship", we have a valuable discussion of
(1) McConnell, op. cit., p. 124. So also Rashdall es-
pecially.
(2) ibid., pp. 126-136.
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the problems in which we here find ourselves involved.
As we think of what creatorship implies,^ we come
to the conclusion that there could hardly be a
heavier responsibility conceivable than the creation
of a race of free men. " r2he moment.
another person appears God takes on new obligations
with the arrival of that person. He becomes a mem-
( 3
)
ber of moral society.
"
v ; Membership in a moral
society quite naturally carries with it some limita-
tions; "there are some general obligations upon God
because of his creatorship which must be recognized 11
(
5
There is, indeed, a holiness ''Binding on God himself".
We can not stop with the doctrine that God is love -
essential and wonderful as that is; we cannot, if we
would have the best possible world, if we would make
our lives the best lives, empty 'all the stiff moral-
ity out of the divine nature"/ ' "If we are to
(1) Contrast this, for example, with a view like
Howison'3, which denies entirely the creation of
individual selves.
(2) Sir Oliver Lodge, in his article in the Hibbert
Journal
, p. 715, recognizes this the most clearly of
any of the other exponents of a finite God.
(3) ibid., p. 127.
(4) ibid., p. 123.
(5) Ibid., p. 134.
(6) ibid., p. 133.
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think of God as under obligations of respect to the
freedom of men, we can see something of the unspeak-
able complexity of the tasks before God - that middle
road which must be stern even for God to travel. The
old doctrine of settling all human problems by divine
decree of an Absolute sovereign will not work.
To keep the divine power on the soul and yet to
leave the soul free just to the right degree for the
attainment of moral selfhood is a tax even on divine
resources, a tax that calls not for such mighty
puttings -forth of energy as would move mountains but
self-control and skill and patience beyond all human
understanding".^"^ So God, too, is bound in a way
by the limitations of membership in moral society,
and by a holiness of his own nature which is worthy
of a responsible God.
In this connection let us digress for a.-
moment or two and consider the question of God's
relation to prayer, for it is evident that "in no
field does the idea of a limited God count with
more practical effect than here". In answer to the
question, Can God answer prayer? , we have on the face
of it some limitations - but limitations which are a
part of God '3 very being. These seem to be three in
(1) ibid., pp. 135-136.
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number: (1) "God must be true to me In dealing with
me"; he "cannot deal with a petitioner in any such
fashion as to leave the petitioner less of a man
after the petition has been granted. God cannot
pauperize his children";^ 1 ' (2) the God of the an-
swered prayer must be true "not merely to the peti-
tioner but to all others who compose the family of
God. All prayer is to be conceived in social terms"
(3) the God of the answered prayer must be true to
himself. "It would be a contradiction in terms to
expect the Christ-like God to do an unchristian deed
( 3 )
even in answer to prayer". wy These "limitations" -
if indeed they be limitations - are so self-evident
that they require no further discussion here.
There is yet another limitation of God
which we must consider in relation to prayer, indeed
in relation to any of the cooperative work between'
God and man. "The work together brings a different
result from the work of either taken alone. Man
could not work alone, and God's work is different
when the human mark is upon it". "Unless by the
exercise of inscrutable omniscience, God did not
actually 3ee some rose3 and 3ome fruit 3 till human
(1) Ibid., n. 161.
(2) ibid., p. 153.
(3) ibid., p. 155.

(39)
scientists brought them to perfection"
.
v
' That seems
to limit God practically in a very real sense. And
here on this plane certainly, if anywhere, the "chal-
lenge" of the idea to us as human "beings which so
many of the defenders of a finite God are so fond of
(2)
advocating, ' would certainly be operative. Can
we do less than our best if what we do is to be of
such cosmic significance? So much, then, for the
limitations of God in relation to the world of men.
Following the method of division which we
advocated above, we now come properly to the question
of the real limitations inherent in the divine person-
ality itself. However, since we are here discussing
the real limitations of God, and since everyone of
the limitations urged against God in the connection,
upon closer examination reveals itself really to be,
in the final analysis, not a limitation at all, or.
at best merely formal limitations, we shall not stop
here for further consideration of that question,
leaving its discussion rather to its deserved place.
Leaving then, these limitations of God
which really limit him in any serious way, we come
upon some others which are customarily 30 considered,
(1) ibid., p. 157.
(2) Especially from J. 3. Mill on to the present. Cf.
James, Perry, /ells, Reeraan, Sir Oliver Lodge, et al
.
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but which upon closer inspection are shown to he
rather of a purely formal character. It is these
which we shall now consider.
Here first of all, we are met with the
question. Is God Absolute?^ Hot a few word battles
have centered about this one point. The view has
been often advanced that if we are to believe in an
"absolute 11 God, there will be no place left in the
divine for the relative at all. Some carry this so
far as to hold that "the instant an absolute comes
into relation to anything it ceases to be absolute."
As a result, we find a great deal of scepticism con-
(2)
cerning the absoluteness 01 God. x ' Such scepticism,
really however, amounts to little more than mere
verbalisms, for it is bound by a crass literalism, a
crude belief we might say in the infallibility of the
dictionary where absolute is absolute and relative' is
relative, and there can be no common meeting ground.
But - "in life the absolute may be subjected to 'what-
ever qualifications we may agree upon. Provisionally
God may be thought of as absolute in the sense that
he is dependent on nothing outside of himself",
^
(1) Of., e.g., Bradley, Appearance and Reality and
0. G. J. Webb, God and personality for positive dis-
cussion of the quesTfoh.
(2) Especially prevalent in the rank3 of the finite
God defenders.
(3) McConnell, op. cit., p. 16.
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and any real limitation of God. on this score vanishes
into the thin air of mere form.
Closely connected with this is the further
formal limitation involved in the solution of the re-
lation of the doer to the deed done. We look upon
the universe of matter as G-od r s continuous deed; we
ask, therefore, in what sense is such a continuous
deed a limitation of the doer? ; and we find our answer
in the self-evident fact that any doer is limited by
his own character - that his deed could not he larger
than himself. So it is in that purely formal fashion
that, if we must, we may say that God is limited.
Again some thinkers seem to limit God in
that his is a "course that requires purposeful action
according to reason",^ and it is a more-tJf"S peculi-
arity of our thought that we look upon any such course
a3 "somehow more of a limitation upon a mind than a
course which lets the mind run according to its own
(2)
sweet will". This, too, we see finally to be no
real limitation upon the Divine Being.
Again, the universe is often viewed and
spoken of as a tool in the hands of God, and this
3eern3 to many minds necessarily to imply further
(1) E.g., J. 8. Mill,
(2) McConnell, op. cit., p. 13.
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limitations of the Divine Being. But Is Bishop
McConnell points out, having to work with such a tool
is a limitation only :'until the tool shows its capacity
for enlarging the power of the holder"; and "in such
hands is there much reason for raising the question of
limitation? "^
A more serious limitation, especially in
the opinion of the extreme theological dogmatist or
the naively theological scientist, is that which seems
to he placed on God by the idea of lav;. By some sort
of an odd perversion of the actual status of affairs
,
they hold that "regularity and order are marks of
(2) (3)divine limitation", rather than that "law is
(4)
a statement of God's method in doing". ; Of course,
in this instance it is easy enough to see how that
misconception comes about, for with us as human be-
ings, much of the law with which we come in contact
is law which is imposed almost entirely from without.
Here also, we have more of a formal than a real lim-
itation; indeed, "we simply point out the folly of
the notion that the discovery of law in the universe
means a limitation of the Mind of the Universe" .
^
(1) ibid., p. 22.
(2) ibid., p. 71.
(3) Again see the view of John :;tuart Mill, H. G. Wells,
et al.
(4) ibid., p. 69.
(5) ibid., p. 77.
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Rather "we are at least in line with our own exper-
ience in suggesting that God may find his liberty
through the law which expresses his wisdom" .
In a day when evolution is still somewhat
(2)
the charmed word of the hour, v ' and. when the thought
in so many minds seems decidedly to limit God through
the evolutionary process, Bishop McConnell does well
in pointing out so clearly that here too we find,
when we face the facts, that we are but confronting
another formal limitation. We must realize that
evolution is "really the method by which the Creator
moves through the creative process"; v 1 and further,
that "evolution ought not to be allowed to limit God's
concern to types". And we must not fall back into
that former popular interpretation of the evolution-
ary theory "which made it incurably optimistic, so
optimistic as to threaten the sovereignty of a moral
God".
Again, there is the less serious - though
on the part of the "man-on-the-street" far more
(1) ibid., p. 78. So much of the religious scepticism
of the past half century would have been avoided had
men only recognized this J
(2) Of. especially the emphasis given this point in the
realm of periodical literature. Sir Oliver Lodge,
Overstreet, Wright, Ukichi, Foster, ct al.
(3) McConnell, op. cit., p. 79.
(4) ibid., p. 89.
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common attempt to limit God, or perhaps speaking from
a "bit broader standpoint the divine forces, by their
apparent necessity of having to work through a human
institution like the church. This to many uncritical
minds is an almost hopeless limitation. But we must
remember that the church is not the only agency
through which the divine forces work ; it is but one
of many. However, if some feel they must hold to
this seeming limitation of God, we are quite willing
to grant them their point at least formally - for
of course it is evident that "by his own laws. God
cannot do as much through persons working separately,
as through persons built together as an organism.
Hence the necessity of a church" . ^
Another apparent limitation, one which
seems to be inherent in the nature of personality
itself, is that arising from the relation of person-
ality to the law of development. All personality,
as we know it, seems to be such as to be under a
necessity for development. But since lav/ is really
an expression of God's method in doing, we can hardly
look upon that as a real or serious limitation.
Rather, "if God is developing by laws of his own
nature, then the development is simply a making
(1) Ibid., pp. 134-5.
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explicit what is already implicit 11 . We must raise
the further question, !1 Can we think of God as having
voluntarily so limited himself that in dealing with
the men whom he has created he has "brought into force
a condition which means change to himself? It certain-
ly must make a difference to God whether men move
morally up or down If up..... do they not "bring
to God something he did not have before? Granted
that man cannot add to God's power or his wisdom,
cannot they by their appreciation of God add something
to his life that he might not otherwise have had?
Cannot they by failure to appreciate him take from
him something that would have added to the fullness
of his jo:/? Is this, however, what we mean by being
subject to the laws of the development? I can see
nothing in this to take from the dignity of a God
creating children in his own image and thereby putting
them on a plane where they may or may not respond to
(2)him"
. Such a God is surely far more understandable
and real.
Again, some want to limit God from the
standpoint of personality because true personality
comes only as an outgrowth of moral struggle.
(1) ibid., p. 250.
(2) ibid., p. 251.
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"Looking at the moral aspect again, can we honor a
God who has not won his moral character by a struggle
upward? ^ .hut it is not a matter of
credit or honor merely. ........ The question is as
to a realized ideal Is not a will activity
forever at the full, always acting out the moral ideal,
(2)
worthier still? " And in reply to that question,
upon any adequate moral theory at all, we can "but
say, yes.
Yet a further limitation from the same
standpoint seems to be this: we face on every hand
"the limitation of actual human personality and the
difficulty/ of conceiving a method of 'mowing that
(3)
vrould sweep all into one intuition" . But when
we think through our question, in so far as that is
possible, we come to the conclusion that "there is
no reason to think that God may not have a power of
sympathetic appreciation of men's points of view at
the same time that he sees those points of view in
(4)their relation to ultimate truth".
Then last there is the rather sweeping
(1) So especially H. .7. Wright. This demand implicit
at least in the thinking of most of the finite God
defenders
.
(2) ibid., p. 252.
(3) ibid., p. 252.
(4) ibid., p. 254.
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generalized limitation put upon God by those who in-
sist that, anyway we put it. "personality is not a
large enough conception for God" . "Men have tried
to find some intellectual provision for an escape
from the loneliness of an existence which seems to
them solitary in the uniqueness of its un-
sharable excellence". And yet ultimately, I think
we must agree with Bishop MoConnell that "there is
no inherent contradiction in the thought of divine
personality itself which would forever preclude God
from adequate objects for justice and love and fellow-
ship. The absence of such contradiction is all we
are concerned to show. There is no reason why the
tightness of human personality should mark the Divine
Personality" .
How that we have considered the purely
formal limitations put upon God,, let us look last Of
all at those elements in our consideration of the
divine which on the basis of the old theology would
be limitations but which on the basis of the view
that we are here defending would no longer be limi-
tations at all.
On the basis of the old orthodoxy we
3hould, for example, come up against a rather severe
(1) ibid., p. 256. A crude or at best a semi-refined
anthropomorphism lurk3 behind many expressions of such
a view.
(2) ibid., p. 263. 3o also Rashdall.
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limitation in relation to the problem of forgiveness.
There divine forgiveness was rather an unlimited
thing in the sense of "being dependent we almost might
say on the whim of God. "Whom I will, I love; whom
I will, I hate 1 '. It was not really a moral question
at all. Hoy/ much more to be commended is a view such.
as Bishop McConnell develops here. Forgiveness,
salvation, is not the outgrowth of a mood or tempor-
ary fancy of Deity; "God cannot save men immorally"
.
So, "if forgiveness is limited when it is confined
to moral terms, then limitation is strangely conceiv-
ed, for such limitation would serve to set on high
the unlimited goodness of God. No soundly penitent
seeker would ask to be forgiven on any but moral
terms".. Rather, in the end, "every phase of
forgiveness will be seen to be a manifestation of
the unlimited moral goodness of God"
.
Again, on the old view people looked upon
an infallible revelation as an evidence of an unlim-
ited God. But Bishop LicConnell says, "Let us ask
ourselves what we would do v/ith an infallible revela-
tion if we had it. One thing we v/ould have to do -
we would have forthwith to give up the idea of a
moral God training children into likeness with
(1) ibid., p. 147.
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himself".
The old orthodoxy, too, has fallen prey
to an exclusiveness of immortality, and has "been most
profuse in its denunciation and condemnation to an
eternal oblivion all those souls not in accord with
its own circumscribed narrowness. Such a view of
God as that would imply let us contrast with that of
the author of Is God Limited? " Almost as ser-
ious a limitation as we could possibly put upon God
would be to accept some of the doubts about immortal-
(2)ity. If God is limited to the present life in
dealing with men, we have cut deeply into his power
,
and if he limits himself to the present life, we have
a God of doubtful moral character". ' ''Once created,
the soul has inalienable rights a soul
cannot be allowed to perish until no other course
(4)is morally possible" . So we may conclude that,
rather than limiting God after the fashion of the
old orthodoxy, "if we can believe in immortality,
at one stroke our thought of God is immeasurably
relieved and expanded. A God 3hut up to dealing
(1) ibid., p.
(2) The Old idea of Hell would certainly tend to do
away with any real immortality for by far the greater
numbe r of s oul s
.
(3) ibid., p. 230.
(4) ibid., p. 234.
-
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with, persons on a merely earthly plan would "be in-
deed a limited God' 1 ^ 1 ^
Thinking in terms of that older view,
another evidence of non-limitation would be his
impassibility, on which at one time such emphasis
was laid. It is not a worthy conception of God. we
were told, which brings him within the reach of pain.
i!How can we think of a God who can be pained as the
infinite?", for "the most limiting experience that
we know is pain". So, they thought, "if pain reaches
to the center of the universe we have seriously lim-
ited God". But let us here again contrast our view -
stated in Bishop McConnell's words - with this. "I
think a sound Christian consciousness would insist
that if pain does not reach God, God is limited. .
.
...If God cannot know pain, he is limited in his own
(2)personal being" . To this the critic might reply
that he is not denying feeling to God but the feel-
ing of pain. That would leave us worse off still.
"If God can feel and yet does not feel pain for the
sufferings of the children whom he has called into
the world, we have a moral lack in him which makes
him unworthy".' ^ "A God who cannot suffer with and
(1) ibid., po. 239-40.
(2) ibid., p. 284.
(3) ibid., p. 235.
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for men is below the level of the thousands of men
who willingly suffer for causes and persons
There is no way for God to escape sorrow if he is a
God of love", So "sorrow may be not an index of
weakness or limitation but of strength and outreach
(1)
of moral understanding" . On our view, then, God
would be limited not at all by his power of suffer-
ing, but only indeed by that state of "impassibility"
so dear to the old orthodoxy. Certain it is that
such a suffering God is much nearer man; he is an
understanding and understandable Father,, and not an
unfeeling and incomprehensible taskmaster - and a
God who is infinitely more worthy of faith and wor-
ship and reverence and love and service.
These, then, instead of being limitations
of God as they would surely be on the old view, prove
themselves no longer to be limitations at all; indeed,
rather then limiting or narrowing our thought of God,
they permit U3 to hold to a conception of God which
is vastly enlarged and expanded.
As a result of our examination of Bishop
"cGonnell's defence of a finite God, we find that we
are at last in possession of a view which has come
up before the judgment bar of truth, but which has
(1) ibid., pp. 237-33.
-
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not "been found wanting.
Before passing, however, to our conclusion
let us look briefly at one more exposition of the
(2)idea - that by Professor Edgar 3. Brightman.
Here we find an approach which is, I believe, as
unique as it is essential - an approach growing out
of a well-rounded theory of moral obligation.
Metaphysical progress, eternal development, is, I
believe, a religious faith that follows from the
nature of moral obligation; for the end commanded by
cLttty will never be attained until every person has
exhausted all of his possibilities of ideal-forming
and ideal-realizing: that is to say, it will never
be finally attained". But if we accept such a view
we are met with "the problem of the perfectible
(1) I have really but one criticism to offer of Bishop
McConnell's defence of the idea, and that is that he
gives no adequate recognition to the problem necessar-
ily growing out of the existence of great numbers of
human beings who are in one way or another defective
mentally, and who cannot as a result properly be said
to have moral life."1 Bishop I.'cConnell feels keenly the
problem presented by animal suffering; but do we not
here have a far greater perplexity?
(2) To whom I am indebted for many of the suggestions
upon which I have based my own view of a finite God.
Professors Brightman and Raahdall and Bishop McGonnell
are the thinkers who have helped me most in arriving
at and formulating that view.
(3) "The Meaning of Obligation". Rochester Theological
Seminary Bulletin, IIov., 1924.
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universe implied by morality and the perfect God im-
plied by religion" . If we mean Christianity when we
speak of religion, and if we rightly interpret that
Christianity, says Professor Brightman, the problem
will he "largely verbal"; for "Christianity believes
in a perfect God hut has never believed that the
universe is now perfect" . By divine perfection,
however, it has not meant that its God is - or was -
static, that is "until God fell into the hands of
the theologians. For historical Christianity God
was a being in whose life something happens: crea-
tion, atonement, joy over sinners that repent, the
grov/th of the kingdom" . "Christianity essentially
believes in the reality of change". "A static per-
fection is not perfect. The law of obligation
always drives beyond what we are to more discoveries,
higher values, new relations with others and with."
ooa^.
(1)
Out of these facts, then, we formulate a
view of God. "We may", therefore, "admit that the
actual facts of our world become much easier to in-
terpret if instead of the utterly timeless God of
theologians we have a living God for whom the evolu-
tion that is hi3 favorite method i3 no mere form,
(1) S. Brightman, op. cit., pp. 69-70.
?!
-
-
-
-
-
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but is a real experience. A C-od to "be a God must
know everything that can he known and be able to do
everything that can be done; but a rational, responsi-
ble, personal God must be loyal to the conditions of
rationality, responsibility and personality, unless
the cosmos is mere chaos. We have been too anxious
in defence of abstract concepts of eternity, infinity
and perfection to be thoroughly alert to the inter-
pretation of reality. A moral God, eternally active,
eternally creative, eternally reasonable is indeed a
God who will forever and changelessly be loyal to
the same fundamental principles of obligation and
value: but he is also a God who is limited by the
very conditions of his being".
It has been a long road from Epicurus'
s
formulation of the finite God theory in the third
century B.C. down to Bishop McConnell's significant
development of that theory in the twentieth century
A.D. In that idea of God has been found a common
meeting ground for such diverse thinkers as the pagan
philosopher of Athens: the Persian Manichaeus ; the
Christian L'arcion: the eighteenth-century trio -
Voltaire, Rousseau, and "the terrible David" Hume,
who so inspired their orthodox brethren of the day
(1) ibid., p. 70.
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with fear for the faith; these philosophers of widely
different schools of thought - James and John Stuart
Mill, James, Schiller, Perry, Howison, McTaggart,
Hobhouse, Rashdall, and Brightmanj the popular novel-
ist and historian, H. G. Wells: a Unitarian clergyman,
E. H« Reemanj the English physicist and spiritualist.
Sir Oliver Lodge; the Japanese Ukichi; and a Bishop
of the Methodist Episcopal Church - P. J. MoConnell.
Surely where there is such smoke, there must be some
fire J While the whole truth has hardly been revealed
to any single observer, each observer has given some
partial superiority of insight from the peculiar van-
tage point which has been his.
At times there have been for each many
almost insuperable difficulties in the way of any
adequate world view. They have tried in those moments
to interpret and harmonize as best they can with some
sort of a theism what Wordsworth called the eternal
and daily spectacle
" of the dread strife
Of Poor humanity '3 afflicted will
Struggling in vain with ruthless destiny".
To some this ruthless destiny has been but
the expression of a power not God, a power which is
apart from and in opposition to God. By attributing
it to something not divine they have been able to
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hold on to a God - severely limited as lie is - who is
yet good. To others, this same "ruthless destiny -
while it has indeed lost none of its ruthlessness,
while nature has still appeared to them i!red in tooth
and claw'' 1 , - does not seem a destiny apart from G-od
out one which is the result of the working out of a
final good purpose of a good God, difficult thmigh
the conditions of its realization ma:/ be. To all
the problem has been a very real one; the attempts to
"Assert eternal Providence
And justify the ways of God to man"
sincere ones.
I think, indeed, that it is evidence of a
growing goodness in men's natures that what they after
all seem to be seeking and reaching out to is not a
God who is powerful above everything else and a
universe whose salvation is all "cut and driec",
but a God who is himself developing, whose very be-
ing is morality; who is not an object of dread or
terror, or even fear but who is a God of moral love
and moral inspiration; a God in every sense worthy
of reverence and worship. Moral men in a moral uni-
verse must have a moral God. We are today impatient
of the old and barren abstractionism which talked
much of divinity and its attributes but which said 30
I
(107)
little; we want to come to closer grips with the real-
ity of the world we know as it relates to God. Man
has taken a real step forward in the recognition of
the evolutionary character of the universe of which
he is a part: and in a growing universe it will hardly
be possible for him to remain content with the static
God-conceptions of the older theologians. The God-idea
must be a meaningful one to him- as surely it Is when
it is truly grasped - or he will have none of it.
This is the tendency in much of our thinking today,
a tendency well expressed in the words of Robert Louis
Stevenson, which I quote humbly and in all reverence;
"It's a simple thing that I demand,
Though humble as can be -
A statement fair in my Maker 1 s hand
To a gentleman like me -
A clean account, writ fair and broad,
And a plain apologee -
Or deevil a ceevil word to God
From a gentleman like me .
"
Yes - moral men will demand a moral God.
And I believe that ultimately that "statement fair"
for which men are asking will be found in that theory
of a finite God it\ its be3t aspects with which we have
been here dealing.





1 1719 02483 0673
B. U. Libraries
Not to be taken from this room

